

FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA



**MINISTRY OF WATER AND ENERGY
AND
MINISTRY OF IRRIGATION AND LOWLANDS**

**HORN OF AFRICA - GROUNDWATER FOR RESILIENCE
PROJECT (P174867)**

Revised Draft

**SECURITY RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT PLAN
(SRAMP)**

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LISTS OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CDD	Community Driven Development
CERC	Contingency Emergency Response Component
CoC	Code of Conduct
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ESCP	Environmental and Social Commitment Plan
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
EHS	Environmental and Health Safety
ESHS	Environmental, Social and Health Safety
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
ESRS	Environmental and Social Review Summary
ESS	Environmental and Social Standard
E & S	Environmental and Social
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragile and Conflict Vulnerable
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FLID	Farmers-Led Irrigation Development
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic product
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GRC	Grievance redress Committee
GRM	Grievance Redress Mechanism
GRS	Grievance Redress Service
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communication
GW	Groundwater
GW4RP	Groundwater for Resilience Project
GWPIT	Groundwater Project Implementation Team
HEAT	Hostile Environment Awareness and Training
HoA	Horn of Africa
HoA-GW4RP	Horn of Africa-Ground Water for Resilience Project
HoAI	Horn of Africa Initiative
HUTLC	Historically Underserved Traditional-Local Communities
KII	Key Informant Interview
IA	Implementing Agency
IDA	International Development Assistance
IDC	Irrigation Development Commission
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IDPD	Irrigation Development Project Division
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPF	Investment Project Financing
LMP	Labor Management Procedure
LRP	Livelihood Restoration Plan
MAR	Managed Aquifer Recharge
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEP	Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoF	Ministry of Finance

MoIL	Ministry of Irrigation and Lowlands
MoWE	Ministry of Water and Energy
MPA	Multiphase Programmatic Approach
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
OAU	Organization of African Union
O&M	Operation and Maintenance
OHS	Occupational and Health Safety
OP	Operational Policy
One-WaSH-CWA	One-WaSH-Consolidated WaSH Account Project
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAP	Project Affected People
PCN	Project Concept Note
PDO	Project Development Objective
PFU	Project Focal Unit
PIT	Project Implementation Team
PLWHIV	People Living with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
PMCU	Project Management and Coordination Unit
PPE	Personal Protection Equipment
RCA	Root Cause Analysis
RF	Resettlement Framework
RPCU	Regional Project Coordination Unit
SCAP	Safeguards Corrective Action Plan
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SEP	Stakeholder Engagement Plan
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SH	Sexual Harassment
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SPIS	Solar Powered Irrigation System
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
SRMP	Security Risk Management Plan
SWE	South West Ethiopia
TA	Technical Assistance
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TBA	Trans-boundary Aquifer
TPM	Third-Party Monitoring
TTL	Task Team Leader
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
UWSSP	Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project
VAC	Violence Against Children
VAW	Violence Against Women
VHF	Very High Frequency
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
WASHCOMs	WASH committees
WB	The World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WDC	Water Development Commission
WME	Water Mines and Energy
WIM	Water Irrigation and Mines
WIME	Water Irrigation Mines and Energy

WRM	Water Resources Management
WRMD	Water Resources Management Division
WSSD	Water Supply and Sanitation Division
WUAs	Water Users Associations

Executive Summary

The assessment is conducted starting from July 25-October 30, 2022. Particularly the data collection activity is completed from September 20-October 05, 2022. During the data collection, 15 experts and 105 community members have participated from three regional states (SNNP, Oromia, Sidama) and Dire Dawa city administration. Among the total participants 29 of them are female and the rest 91 are male. At the lower level of sampling unit, four Woredas and four villages/kebeles are selected for this assessment.

The overall rating for the sample regional states is 6.5 or medium and in the case of Woredas it is 5.5. The average rating of the summation of the regional and woreda score is 6. Thus, the combined overall rating of the sample regional states and woredas is 6/medium.

The Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan is conducted based on community and stakeholder consultation, and desk review based assessment. The key threats identified at regional and Woreda level are presented as follows:

Summary of key rating at regional/city level

Security Risks Identified	Rating	Regional States/City
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	25-Unacceptable	Oromia
Theft to construction materials at project site	12 Medium	Oromia
Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas	12 Medium	Oromia
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	9 Medium	Oromia
local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans	9 Medium	SNNP, Dire Dawa and Oromia
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	9 Medium	SNNP and Oromia
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	9 Medium	SNNP and Oromia
OHS risks to security personnel	25-Unacceptable	Oromia
Overall rating of the sample areas	5 Medium	

Summary of key rating at woreda/cluster level

Security Risks Identified	Rating	Woreda/cluster
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Community protest	20 High	Arba Minch Zuria
Intimidation	20 High	Arba Minch Zuria
Abduction	20 High	Arba Minch Zuria
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	20 High	Arba Minch Zuria
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	15 High	Jeldessa
OHS risks to security personnel	9 Medium	Arba Minch Zuria
Overall rating of the sample areas	7 Medium	

Key mitigation measures include the following:

1. Recruit a dedicated security coordinator to oversee the implantation of security measures and incident management
2. Engage local communities and other stakeholders for investment in project success, including consequences for when security guarantees are not met (Red Lines)
3. Incident reporting structures formalized and communicated, both to staff and beneficiaries (see Annexes 3, 4 and 5 for various incident reporting templates)
4. Pre-identify possible sources of psychosocial and medical support in project implementation areas, should security incidents affecting personnel take place
5. Pre-departure checks to be carried out for all field travel, and vehicles must be equipped with emergency items, including first aid kits
6. Coordination and de-confliction with Ethiopian Defence Forces and regional armed forces

Assessment summary:

The implementation of the HoA-GW4RP Project in the Regions initially selected (Afar, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambela, SNNP, Sidama, SNNP, SWE, Harari, Oromia, Tigray and Somali Regions) and Dire Dawa city will likely be met by significant safety and security risks that must not be underestimated.

Ongoing military operations, increasing criminality, and civil unrest, as well as reports of fatalities of government employees as a result of security incidents all indicate an operating environment in need of dedicated security risk management. Without a responsive and agile security risk management system, project implementation risks either being limited to urban centers or major program disruption due to delays and losses in the field.

1. Introduction

World Bank has attached high importance to security risk assessment and management plan from the early years of the recognition of risk based approach in Fragile and Conflict Vulnerable (FCV) area and has actively helped client countries to assess these risks. In doing so, the World Bank developed protocols related to SRAMP as well as national risk assessment process, with a view to facilitate the risk assessment. It helps the countries develop their capacity to collect and analyze the useful data, statistics and information and introduce a risk based approach. Hence, this report intends to identify the risks related to the insecurity area and their impacts on the Project implementation process, Project implementing parties including the communities, government staff, the project implementation teams (PIT)/Ministry of Irrigation and Lowlands (MoIL) and Project Management and Coordination Unities (PMCU)/ Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE), and the World Bank team while undertaking their customary assignments and develop strategic plan to mitigate the envisaged impacts.

The security risk assessment and management plan considers i) scanning security threats and their impacts on smooth implementation related to the Ethiopia Horn of Africa (HoA) Groundwater for resilience Project, ii) identifying the extent of the impact on the community, implementing personnel including implementing institutions' experts PMCU, PITs and the World Bank team and determine the potential exposure to the foreseen risk and their impacts, iii) indicating the potential environmental and social impacts of the security risks, iv) providing operational recommendations for ensuring security threats are well captured in advance in all the Project components and their activities, v) proposing strategic plan to mitigate the impacts of the security risks and enhance smooth Project implementation; and vi) estimating the cost of the potential impact and its implication on the future operation.

1.1. Project Background

The proposed project (Horn of Africa: Groundwater for Resilience Project) is part of global initiative for regional integration in the HoA. It is a regional integration priority to strengthen the climate resilience targeted communities through the collaborative management and use of groundwater resources. Five countries—the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Republic of Djibouti, the Republic of Kenya, the Federal Republic of Somalia, and Sudan—as well as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), are included in this regional program, which

uses a horizontal multi-country Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA). The project is part of the Horn of Africa Initiative, which is founded on four pillars: (i) regional infrastructure networks; (ii) trade and economic integration; (iii) resilience and (iv) human capital. This program is being supported under the Resilience Pillar of the HoA. The Horn of Africa (HoA) is one of the most vulnerable regions of the world, characterized by complex development challenges and varying degrees of conflict and fragility, food crises, and social, political, and economic conditions. For the purpose of this Program, the Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. In the case of Ethiopia, the project target areas are Amhara, Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Sidama, SWE, Somali and Tigray regional states and Dire Dawa city administration. The HoA-GW4RP will directly benefit some of Ethiopia's poorest citizens in the woredas it covered.

The proposed project will improve the sustainable use and management of groundwater, which thereby boosts water supply access to poor and vulnerable farmers, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. In the long run, the project will contribute to improving the livelihood and welfare condition of the communities. It is also endowed with an opportunity to enhance the socio-economic cooperation and collaboration among the target regional states.

In terms of impact, Ethiopia: HoA-GW4RP project is expected to have both positive and negative impacts in the direct Project Influence Area (PIA) and proxy impact in the indirect influence area. The potential social impacts will be quicker felt in the direct influence area. The adverse (or negative) social impacts are very minimal and could not make significant impacts that will impede the life of the local population. As a result, in additions to other Environment and Social Risk Management tools; the preparation of the Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan will help to provide potential strategic options to address the identified security risks and mitigate the impacts.

1.2. Project Overview

Project Objective: The PDO is “to increase the sustainable access and management of groundwater in Ethiopia”. It envisioned to be achieved through implementation of three interlinked components: i) Groundwater Potential Assessment and Infrastructure Development for Inclusive Community-level use; ii) strengthening groundwater institutions and information, and iii) project management, knowledge, and operational support.

Components of the project: The project is a regional trans-boundary groundwater management priority to advance the resilience building on GW use and management agenda. The project targets hotspot areas requiring the most urgent interventions and benefit the most vulnerable groups. Sub-project locations will be selected based on criteria including nutrition and health problems, crop and livestock losses, lack of access to basic services, prevalence of drought and flood and diseases outbreaks, positive environmental and development impacts, and absence of financing from other sources. The project will benefit an estimated 1.48 million people living in the selected drought prone and water stressed areas. The Project is expected to enhance ground water management institutional capacities within Ministry of Water and Energy (MoWE) improve the national ground water information and monitoring system and promote collaboration with other HoA member countries on Groundwater management. The Project would have the following four components (see on table 1 below):

Table 1: Summary of estimated cost of project components

No	Component name	Est. Cost (million USD)
Component 1: Groundwater Potential Assessment and Infrastructure Development for Inclusive Community-level Use (\$191 million)		
1.1	Subcomponent 1.1 -Groundwater Potential Assessment and Aquifer recharge (\$67.5 Million)	
	GW potential assessment in prioritized areas, including borderland sites	\$ 54.45
	Design and implementation of Managed Aquifer Recharge in Dire Dawa plain	\$3.90
	Development and management of monitoring wells	\$9.14
1.2.	Subcomponent 1.2 Utilization of groundwater for water supply (human and livestock) as well as enhancing service delivery management capacity (US\$ 119.5 million)	
	Increasing rural and pastoral access to WS services	\$113.5
	Enhancing service delivery management capacity	\$6.0
1.3.	Subcomponent 1.3. Utilization of groundwater for irrigation (US\$ 5 million)	
Component 2: Strengthening groundwater institutions and information (US\$ 8 million)		
2.1.	Subcomponent 2.1: Strengthening institutional capacity for groundwater management (US\$ 3 million).	
2.2.	Subcomponent 2.b. Enhancing groundwater information and monitoring System (US\$ 5 million).	
Component 3: Project management, Knowledge, and operational support (US\$ 10 million):		
	Capacity building and additional implementation support	
	Project management and coordination expenses	
	Application of environmental and social safeguard instruments	
	Knowledge management M&E and experience sharing.	
Component 4: Contingent Emergency Response Component (US\$ 0 million)		

The components which are likely to have security risks includes component 1, 2 and 3. Some of the security threats are commonly observed across the first three components. These commonly observed security threats include; access blockage to regions and woredas (especially in Oromia), risk of GBV/SEA/SH (more observed in Oromia), Unmet community expectations, or where benefit

sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair (especially in SNNP and Oromia), burglary of work place/residence and financial corruption. Hence, six (6) types of security threats are identified as commonly observed security risks and we acknowledge the fact that there is a difference on the level of severity and frequency across different Kebeles, Woredas and regional states. On the other hand, nine (9) security threats are associated with more conflict affected areas or areas with a potentially conflict prone areas. These include; armed robbery, armed conflict between government and non-government forces, local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans, trespassing and community protests. Though, the five security risks can be observed in all conflict prone project areas when we see in terms of the project components, they are more likely to be observed during the implementation of project components 1 and 2. The other types of security risks such as acts of violence (more to be observed in Oromia), arrest and detention, intimidation (more to be observed in Dire Dawa) and abduction (more to be observed in SNNP) are more likely to be observed in a conflict prone areas and they can be associated with all the first three components 1,2 and 3 of the project. Given that security personnel are deployed, security risk related to OHS risks to security risks will be likely to be observed on areas where these personnel are placed. Finally, security threats like theft of construction materials and labor influx and women trafficking will likely be observed on areas where components 1 and 2 of the project, especially project sub-components which involves construction activities.

1.3. Objective of the Security Risk Assessments and Management Plan

General Objective

The overall objective of this security risk assessment and management plan is to assess and identify the potential security risks and their impacts on project implementation, project workers and the beneficiary community in the project intervention areas, and to develop a strategic plan to mitigate the envisaged impacts..

Specific objectives

- To identify, evaluate, and prioritize potential security risks and impacts likely to affect the safety and security of persons and operation of the project;
- To understand and respond to community concerns and perceptions;
- To outline procedures to monitor and report on performance of security measures;
- To determine appropriate security arrangements; and

- To propose mitigation measures and security management plan for the identified security risks and impacts related to the project.

2. Methodology for Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan

Study design: The SRAMP study is cross-sectional pre-test/posttest design with no control group.

Target Population: The key target population for the SRAMP is comprised of groups and individuals who will be potentially affected by the components of the HoA-GW4RP project including the disadvantaged or vulnerable groups who stay in project intervention areas during the period of the field assessment. More specifically, it has considered the mentioned individuals and groups who are found in nine regions (Afar, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Sidama, SNNP, Somali, South-West Ethiopia and Harar) and Dire Dawa City Administration. As per the PMCU, 67 priority Woredas are identified to be benefited GW investigation or monitoring activities, 55 Woredas under water supply and 5 Woredas under irrigation intervention. As a result, a total number of 127 Woredas will be benefited under the three interrelated activity schemes.

Study Areas and Sites: This SRAMP study has focused on context analysis based on data that is gathered at national, woreda administration/regional level in Oromia, Sidama, SNNP and Dire Dawa City Administration. During the preparation of the Resettlement Framework (RF) and Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), three Woredas were selected from three regional states (one from Oromia, SNNP and Somali regional states each). For this study, we have considered the distribution of Woredas under the water supply activity, GW investigation (sub-component 1.1.) and irrigation scheme (sub-component 1.3.) which is 35 Woredas from SNNP (27 under GW investigation and 8 GW inclusive water supply intervention-sub-component 1.2.), 24 Woredas from Oromia (7 under GW investigation, 12 GW inclusive water supply intervention and 5 irrigation intervention), 9 woredas from Sidama (7 under GW investigation and 2 GW inclusive water supply intervention), and 3 clusters¹ from Dire Dawa city administration (1 under GW investigation and 2 GW inclusive water supply intervention). In order to maintain regional representation and intervention activity inclusion; one Woreda will be selected from the

¹ In the case of Dire Dawa city administration, the rural Woredas are arranged in a cluster format and a cluster can have an average number of 12-20 kebeles.

three regional states and one city administration. In terms of intervention activities representation two Woredas will be selected from GW investigation (sub-component 1.1.) or monitoring category, another one Woredas will be selected from water supply intervention category (sub-component 1.2.) and one woreda will be selected from irrigation intervention (sub-component 1.3.). In additions to that, based on secondary review criteria like GBV, asset destruction and armed conflict are considered during the selection of the sample woredas. Thus, the total sample size of the Woredas is 3 and one cluster. Summary of the selected Woredas and one cluster for the SRAMP study is presented below.

Table 2: Sample sites selected for the SRAMP study.

S.no	Region/City	Zone	Woredas/Cluster	Remark
1	Oromia	Borena	Dire	For Irrigation Intervention.
2	SNNP	Gamo	Arba Minch Zuria	For GW Investigation scheme.
3	Sidama	NA	Shebedino	For GW Investigation scheme.
4	Dire Dawa	NA	Jeldesa cluster	For GW Inclusive Water Supply.
Total		4	4	

Methods: In order to carry out the SRAMP for HoA-GW4RP project, both secondary and primary sources of data are considered using qualitative approach. This help to explore and produce cultural descriptions, uncovering multiple realities and complexities of factors that pose potential security threats of the project covered regions of Ethiopia. The study is conducted on three selected Woredas and one cluster. Besides, some data from the RF and ESMF reports of this project were used. Related documents and studies are reviewed in addition to the National and International Laws and Proclamations as well as Ethiopian government rules and regulation associated with social inclusion, protection and security landscapes. The review of the existing social safeguards instruments has framed in the context of the HoA-GW4RP document and the security risks, security management needs and gaps. The assignment also involves the assessment of any policy/legal conditions that may have changed and institutional changes that may have occurred and need consideration.

Besides to existing data and analysis relevant to the sector and project, the data collection has relied on a combination of three stages; (i) conduct a Rapid Context Assessment of available data, identifying stakeholders and key issues, (ii) undertaking a gap analysis (additional data or consultations), and (iii) reaching out the regions, woreda and cluster and other stakeholders to collect

and organize data and information to fill the gap through different means like face-to face interview where possible and phone calls and emails as relevant. The data collection tool is included in Annex 11. With regard to this, the regional level office heads of the PMCU-MoWE and PIT-MoIL has played an important role in organizing face-to-face interview, telephone call interview and exchanging information via email. For this, the consultant has prepared and distributed interview guide checklist questions for key informants (data collection tool). The key informants are experts from regional water and energy bureau and woreda offices and community members from various Kebeles. Data were collected from three regional states: Sidama (Shebedino Woreda-), Oromia (Dire Woreda) and SNNP (Arba Minch Zuria Woreda-Kusume Community), and Dire Dawa city administration (Jeldesa Woreda/Cluster). Besides, the study is substantiated by the first-hand data collected from Somali (Jigjiga Woreda), Oromia (Borena Teltele) and SNNPR (Humbo Woreda); during the preparation of RF and ESMF of this project.

Table 3: Summary of stakeholder and community consultation at regional, zone, woreda and village levels

No	Participants at different administrative level	Social Status	Gender		Total
			Male	Female	
At Regional/city and zone Level					
1	Dire Dawa City	Experts from City Water, Mines and Energy office	3	-	3
2	Gamo Zone	Experts from Zone Water, Irrigation and Mines Development Departmenr	2	-	2
3	Sidama Region	Experts from regional Water, Mines and Energy Bureau	2	-	2
At Woreda level					
4	Dire Dawa- Jeldesa cluster	Experts from cluster experts	2	-	2
5	Gamo-Arba Minch Zuria Woreda	Experts from Woreda Water, Mines and Energy office	2	-	2
6	Sidama-Shebedino Woreda	Experts from Woreda Water, Irrigation, Mines and Energy office	2	-	2
At Kebele level					
7	Dire Dawa-Jeldessa-Debele Kebele-Tereko Village	Community members	60	17	77
8	Gamo-Arba Minch Zuria-Chano Mille Village	Community members	7	6	13
9	Sidama-Shebedino-Diramo Aferara Village	Community members	11	6	17
Grand total			91	29	120

3. Review of National Policies and Legal Frameworks

3.1. National Policies and Legal Frameworks

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has formulated several development policies, proclamations and strategies to improve the livelihood and to promote sustainable development of Ethiopian people in general and the rural communities in particular. The policies, strategies and legal frameworks that are reviewed and discussed in the following sections are directly or indirectly applicable during the implementation of HoA-GW4RP.

3.1.1. The Constitution of Ethiopia

The Constitution of the FDRE is the highest policy and legal document that lays the basis for all laws and policies in the country. The Constitution of FDRE provides a number of basic and comprehensive principles that consider social protection and management in the country including the sustainable development. It recognizes the existence of diverse socio-cultural groups, including historically disadvantaged and underserved communities, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and minorities as well as their rights to socioeconomic equity and justice. The relevant articles to security risks and impacts provisions among others are identified below:

Table 4: Summary of articles from the FDRE constitution related to human right, protection and security

No	Article	Description
1	Article 14: Rights to life, the Security of Person and Liberty	This article states that every person has the inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of person and liberty.
2	Article 15: Right to Life	Every person has the right to life. No person may be deprived of his life except as a punishment for a serious criminal offence determined by law.
3	Article 16: The Right of the Security of Person	Everyone has the right to protection against bodily harm.
4	Article 17: Right to Liberty	No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. No person may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, and no person may be detained without a charge or conviction against him.
5	Article 18: Prohibition against Inhuman Treatment	Sub article 1 in this article states that everyone has the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
6	Article 25: Right to Equality	All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, or other social origin, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.
7	Article 24. Right to Honor and Reputation	Everyone has the right to respect for his human dignity, reputation and honor, Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality in a manner compatible with the rights of other citizens, Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person.

8	Article 26: Right to Privacy	Article 26(1) state that everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any property under/his personal possession.
9	Article 28: Crimes against Humanity	Article 28(1) states that criminal liability of persons who commit crimes against humanity, so defined by international agreements ratified by Ethiopia and by other laws of Ethiopia, such as genocide, summary executions, forcible disappearances or torture shall not be barred by statute of limitation. Such offences may not be commuted by amnesty or pardon of the legislature or any other state organ.
10	Article 32: Freedom of Movement	Article 32(1) states that any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he wishes to.
11	Article 37: Rights of Access to Justice	Everyone has the right to bring a justifiable matter to, and to obtain a decision or judgment by, a court of law or any other competent body with judicial power.
12	Article 42: Rights of Labor	Article 42(2) stipulates that ‘workers have the right to a healthy and safe work environment’, obliging an employer (be it government or private) to take all necessary measures to ensure that workplace is safe, healthy and free of any danger to the wellbeing of workers.
13	Article 44: Environmental Rights	Article 44(1) stipulates all persons have the right to live in clean and healthy environment.
14	Article 87: Principles for National Defense	Article 87(3) it states that the armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution.
15	Article 90: Social Objectives	Article 90(1) states that to the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security.
16	Article 92: Environmental Objectives	Government shall endeavor to ensure that all Ethiopians live in a clean and healthy environment.

3.2. Ethiopian Relevant Laws and Regulations

The environmental and social impacts of development should be assessed to ensure that projects, as much as possible, must be environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable. In one way or another, this ultimately contributes to ensure sustainable development. In this regard, policies, legislative frameworks, guidelines and standards have been developed by the government of Ethiopia to contribute for the enhancement of sustainable development. The relevant policy, legal and administrative frameworks of the government of Ethiopian and the policies of the World Bank have been reviewed in the following sections.

Table 5: Summary of Ethiopian relevant laws and regulations

No	National laws and regulations	Description
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1	National Social Protection Strategy of Ethiopia -2012	The general objective to create an enabling environment in which citizens (including people with special need and other vulnerable groups have the right to equitable access to all social protection services that will enhance their growth and development. Ethiopia's social protection policy is a central public policy component for addressing poverty, vulnerability and inequality.
2	Proclamation No.1097/2018 Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	In relation to Gender Based Violence, proclamation No. 1097/2018, article 28 bestows powers and duties to the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth to: "design strategies to effectively prevent and take measures against gender-based violence against women; implement same in collaboration with relevant organs; facilitate the setting up centers for provision of holistic health, psychological, legal and rehabilitation services for women who were victims of violence; and follow up the implementation of same." Moreover, program specific GBV Action Plan has been prepared for HoA-GW4RP (Please refer GBV Action Plan Annex 18 on the ESMF).
3	Ethiopian National Policy on Women-1993	States that "all economic and social programs and activities should ensure equal access for both men and women to the country's resources and in the decision-making process so that women can benefit equally from all activities carried out by the Federal and Regional Institutions."
4	National Policy on Empowerment of Women-2001	states that "All forms of violence against women, physical and mental, whether at domestic or societal levels, including those arising from customs, traditions or accepted practices shall be dealt with effectively with a view to eliminate its incidence. Institutions and mechanisms/schemes for assistance will be created and strengthened for prevention of such violence, including sexual harassment at workplace and customs like dowry; for the rehabilitation of the victims of violence and for taking effective action against the perpetrators of such violence. A special emphasis will also be laid on programs and measures to deal with trafficking in women and girls."
5	National Plan of Action for Gender Equality (NAPGE) for the period 2006 – 2010	Its goal is "to contribute to the attainment of equality between men and women in social, political and economic development."
6	Labor Proclamation No. 1156/2019	<p>The proclamation under its Part Seven, Chapter One, and Article 92 of this proclamation deals with occupational safety, health and working environment, prevention measures and obligations of the employers. Accordingly, the Proclamation obliges the employer to take the necessary measure for adequate safeguarding of the workers in terms of their health and safety.</p> <p>In addition, in this proclamation under its Part Six, Chapter1 and 2 described about women and young safety that women are not assigned on the works that may risk to women health and also overnight work including night shift work.</p> <p>Regarding young employees, organizations do not hire young personnel less than 15 years old and if they hire young between age 15 and 18 years, they should not allow to work more than 7 hours per day and also overnight work including night shift work.</p> <p>Moreover, the Occupation Health and Safety Directive provides the limits for occupational exposure to working conditions that have adverse impacts on health and safety.</p> <p>Women shall not be discriminated against as regards employment and payment on the basis of their sex.</p> <p>It is prohibited to employ women on type of work that may be listed to be particularly odious or harmful to their health; an employer shall not terminate the contract of employment of women during her pregnancy and until four months of her confinement reformulated by Labour Proclamation No.156/2019 as until four months after her confinement.</p> <p>Grant leave to pregnant women without deducting her wage; adhere to the occupational health and safety requirements provided in the proclamation; take appropriate steps to ensure that workers are properly instructed and notified concerning the hazard of their</p>

		<p>respective occupation and the precautions necessary to avoid accident and injury to health; provide workers with protective equipment, clothing and other materials and instruct them of its use; and Ensure that the work place and premises do not cause danger to the health and safety of the workers.</p> <p>Furthermore, the Proclamation defines the occupational safety and health, and working environment focusing on (i) preventive measures, (ii) occupational injuries, (iii) defining degree of disablement, (iv) benefits to employment injuries, (v) medical services. The provisions associated to OHS are delineated on part seven of the Labor Proclamation 1156/2019, from Article 92-112.</p>
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3.3. The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework Requirement

Three Environment and Social Standards (ESS) among the 10 ESS comprising the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) are relevant for this Security Risks Assessment. ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, ESS2 labor and working conditions and ESS4 community health and safety. Those environmental and social standards indicate the need for security protection of the work environment including the requirement to manage risks emanating from engagement of security personnel in the project. The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is a living document to facilitate project planning, preparation, and implementation. It is anticipated that the SRA will be updated as additional information becomes available during project implementation, including in relation to security of personnel/project workers, timing of project activities, and associated due diligence and social risk management.

Table 6: Summary of World Bank environmental and social framework requirements

No	ESS and other standards	Description
1	ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts	<p>The main objective of this Standard is to identify, evaluate and manage the environment and social risks and impacts of the project in a manner consistent with the ESSs. As the result adopt mitigation hierarchy approach to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Anticipate and avoid risks and impacts; - Where avoidance is not possible, minimize or reduce risks and impacts to acceptable levels; - Once risks and impacts have been minimized or reduced, mitigate; and - Where significant residual impacts remain, compensate for or offset them, where technically and financially feasible.
2	ESS2: Labor and Working Conditions	<p>The main objectives of WB ESS 2 are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To promote safety and health at workplace. - To promote the fair treatment, non-discrimination, and equal opportunity of project workers. - To protect project workers, including vulnerable workers such as women, persons with disabilities, children (of working age, in accordance with this ESS) and migrant workers, contracted workers, community workers, and primary supply workers, as appropriate. - To prevent the use of all forms of forced labor and child labor. - To support the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining of project workers in a manner consistent with national law. - To provide project workers with accessible means to raise workplace concerns.

No	ESS and other standards	Description
3	ESS4: Community Health and Safety	<p>The main objectives of WB ESS 4 are the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To anticipate and avoid adverse impacts on the health and safety of project-affected communities during the project life cycle from both routine and non-routine circumstances. -To promote quality and safety, and considerations relating to climate change, in the design and construction of infrastructure, including dams. - To avoid or minimize community exposure to project-related traffic and road safety risks, diseases and hazardous materials. - To have in place effective measures to address emergency events. - To ensure that the safeguarding of personnel and property is carried out in a manner that avoids or minimizes risks to the project-affected communities.
4	The World Bank Group (WBG) Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Guidelines	<p>The WBG EHS Guidelines recognizes project workers and community risk of exposure to physical, chemical and other hazards related to the program activities. These risks may arise from intentional or unintentional trespassing, including potential contact with hazardous material handling and storage. It also suggests the need for prevention and mitigation of the risks through the implementation of project specific plans and relevant applicable management practices. Besides, the relevant Environment and Occupational, Health and Safety (OHS) standards recognize the risks related to construction which include noise and vibration, dust (affecting air quality), wastes, stuck by objects, dusts, work in height, fire and traffic safety risks etc. Moreover, the guideline requires and recognize the program to ensure availability of potable water for drinking, food preparation, for personal hygiene workers in the project site.</p>
5	Good Practice Note: Assessing and Managing the Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security Personnel,	<p>Assessing and Managing the Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security Personnel is provided by World Bank to accompany the ESF and ESSs to support its implementation. Accordingly, the Security Risk Assessment and Management Plan for HOA-GW4RP is also based on the Good Practice Note. Hence, the government of Ethiopia and implementing entities at all levels shall be abide by the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework, Environmental and Social Standards, Good Practice Note: Assessing and Managing the Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security Personnel, ISO 31000 & other pertinent standards and rules.</p>

3.4. World Bank's Good Practice Note on Assessing and Managing Risks of the Use of Security Personnel

When the Borrower retains direct or contracted workers to provide security to safeguard its personnel and property, it will assess risks posed by these security arrangements to those within and outside the Program site. In making such arrangements, the Borrower will be guided by the principles of proportionality and Good International Practices, and by applicable law, in relation to hiring, rules of conduct, training, equipping, and monitoring of such security workers. The Borrower will not sanction any use of force by direct or contracted workers in providing security except when used for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature of the threat.

The Borrower will seek to ensure that government security personnel deployed to provide security services act in a manner consistent with statements in the above paragraph, and encourage relevant authorities to disclose the security arrangements for the Borrower's facilities to the public, subject to

overriding security concerns. The Borrower will (i) make reasonable inquiries to verify that the direct or contracted workers retained by the Borrower to provide security are not implicated in past abuses; (ii) train them adequately (or determine that they are properly trained) in the use of force (and where applicable, firearms), and appropriate conduct toward workers and affected communities; and (iii) require them to act within the applicable law and any requirements set out in the ESCP. The Borrower will review all allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel, take action (or urge appropriate parties to take action) to prevent recurrence, and where necessary, report unlawful acts to relevant authorities.”

Decisions on the appropriate scope of the Projects security arrangements are guided by an assessment of (a) potential risks to the Projects personnel and property, which may require a security response; (b) appropriate responses to the identified security risks; (c) potential impacts of a security incident on the Project, local communities, and other parties; and (d) potential mitigation measures.

The security arrangements for a Project may themselves pose risks to, and impacts on, Project workers and Local communities. It is important to take these risks and impacts into consideration and to determine measures to address them, and this should be part of the ongoing stakeholder engagement on the Project, as described in ESS10. Project-level grievance mechanisms that are available to Project workers, local communities, and other stakeholders allow them to provide feedback on the Project’s security arrangements and personnel.

Periodic assessment of security risks during the life of the Project allows security arrangements to be updated to reflect any new risks or changes in the operating environment. It is good practice for security arrangements to be reviewed annually, or when a major event occurs that could affect the security of the Project or the Project’s operating environment.

3.5. Other Good International Practices and Relevant Standards

There are also other international standards which could be referenced in the preparation, monitoring and implementation of upcoming HoA-GW4RP project Security Management Plan. Common to these Good International Practices they all emphasize that the use of security forces is based on the concept that providing security and respecting human rights can and should be consistent. This translates into implementation of policies and practices that ensure security provision is carried out responsibly, with any response being proportional to the threat.

Proactive communication, community engagement, and grievance redress are central to this approach. Communications shall also often be performed through collaboration between security and community relations departments. Gender considerations are also important, as women often have different experiences and interactions with security personnel. The specific international standards and links for the full document are indicated below:

- UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials:
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx
- UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials:
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/LawEnforcementOfficials.aspx
- Voluntary Principles (VPs) on Security and Human Rights:
<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles>
- A International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. https://icoca.ch/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/INTERNATIONAL-CODE-OF- CONDUCT_Amended_2021.pdf
- Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Program (ACLED, which has a useful risk dashboard tool: <https://www.acleddata.com/>
- International Finance Corporation (IFC) Handbook on the Use of Security Forces: Assessing and Managing Risks and Impacts, 2017 (available in English, French, Spanish) https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_securityforces

Additional World Bank References

1. World Bank Corporate Security Department:
<http://workgroup.worldbank.org/org/units/GSD/GSDCS/Pages/Travel-Security.aspx>
2. World Bank Corporate Security Courses
<http://workgroup.worldbank.org/org/units/GSD/GSDCS/Pages/Course-Offerings.aspx>

4. Security Risk Assessment

Risk assessment is the act of determining the probability that a risk will occur and the impact that event would have, should it occur. This is basically a “cause and effect” analysis. The “cause” is the event that might occur, while the “effect” is the potential impact to HoA-GW4RP project’s activities, should the event occur.

Security risk assessment was conducted to establish, implement and maintain a normal and documented risk assessment process for the risk identification analysis, and evaluation of the proposed HoA-GW4R project in order to:

- Identify security risks due to intentional, unintentional and natural threats that have potential a potential for direct or indirect consequences on the construction of the proposed HoA-GW4RP project activities assets, individual workers and other stakeholders;
- Systematically analyse risks (its likelihood and consequence analysis;
- Determine those risks that have significant adverse impact on construction the activities of the proposed HoA-GW4RP project, contractors, subcontractors, asset, workforces, local community and on the relationships of the MoWE/PMCU, MoIL and employees and the environment;
- Systematically evaluate and prioritize security risk controls and mitigation measures.

Therefore, MoWE/MoIL shall:

- Document and keep this SRA and update it during HoA-GW4RP-project implementation;
- Periodically review whether the quality assurance management scope, policy and risk assessment are still appropriate for the interested parties;
- Re-evaluate security risks within the context of changes within the contractor’s working environment procedures, and relationships with local community; and
- Evaluate the direct and indirect benefits and options to manage security risks and enhance reliability and resilience.

4.1. Objective of the Security Risk Assessment

The following are the main objectives of security risk assessment for HoA-GW4RP:

- Identify, evaluate, and prioritize risks and likely security responses
- Understand and respond to community concerns and perceptions
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4.2. Scope of the Security Risk Assessment

The assessment is undertaken in three Regional States and one city administration with special emphasis on the woredas particularly selected as representing to the three intervention schemes and address key security challenges in those HoA-GW4RP intervention Woredas/clusters with particular emphasis to challenges attributable to implementing HoA-GW4RP activities at the regional, city and local levels. The SRAMP assessment has covered three regional states: Sidama (Shebedino Woreda-), Oromia (Dire Woreda) and SNNP (Arba Minch Zuria Woreda-Kusume Community), and Dire Dawa city administration (Jeldesa Woreda/Cluster).

4.3. Security Context and Threat Assessment

4.3.1. Security Context in Ethiopia

The Socio-political and governance condition of Ethiopia has been characterized with high level of volatility and reputational risk of socio-economic insecurity. Therefore, the consequent high rate of incidents of violence, inter and intra-ethnic conflict, seasonal flood, drought, natural disaster, rural poverty, and rising affects the national and regional peace and security.² The HoA-GW4RP is implemented across one city administration (Dire Dawa) and eleven regional states (Amhara, Afar, Benishangul Gumuz, Gambella, Harar, Oromia, Sidama, Somali, SNNP, Tigray and South East Ethiopia). Due to the inter-ethnic conflict in the northern and other parts of the country, and climate induced social problems leads to high rate of incidents, which means the risk to the World Bank financed projects is currently rated high throughout the country, and with Tigray, Amhara and Afar regional states being rated as more severe. Furthermore, COVID-19, epidemics, and migratory pests (desert locust) are widely considered as “threat multiplier”, which can amplify existing vulnerabilities, inequalities, grievances, societal divides, conflict drivers, fragility, instability, and threats to social cohesion and peaceful resolution process. Ultimately, they become part of the social risk contexts, and thus, in conflict-affected situations (i.e., like the current situation of Ethiopia), they become absorbed into the logic of conflict-not necessarily making the conflict better or worse, but shaping the challenges, incentives, opportunities and calculations of development actors like the

² Stockholm International Peace Research Institute-SIPRI (2020). SIPRI policy paper No. 54: Water security and governance in the Horn of Africa.

WBG. In general, the findings suggest that a rethink is needed on the importance of human security, with the risk, thus far, primarily affecting individuals rather than actors.

Ethnic federalism: Ethiopia became an ethnic-based federal state after the ratification of the federal constitution in 1994. The new constitution gave ethnic groups the right to self-government as well as the option to secede. After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia was divided into nine regional states (kililoch, singular-kilil) and two administratively independent cities. At the end of June 2020, Sidama became the tenth regional state of Ethiopia³. Based on a referendum vote held on September 30, 2021, south west Ethiopia people regional state also go official since 23rd of November, 2021 as Ethiopia's eleventh regional state. The purpose of the system of 'ethnic federalism' was on the one hand to meet the wishes of the different ethnic groups in Ethiopia and on the other hand to keep the country together. Yet, critics believe that the system has placed too much emphasis on the ethnic awareness of Ethiopians and even aggravated ethnic based oppressions. Particularly the younger generations see themselves as 'Oromo', 'Tigrayan', 'Amhara', or 'Somali' rather than 'Ethiopian'.

Military and armed actors: There are dozens of armed actors operating across Ethiopia, and conflict over territory and cattle raiding are prevalent among different ethnic groups. Inter-pastoralist and pastoralist versus agro-pastoralist violence have ensued primarily over resources and cattle rustling/raiding. While a cattle raiding is a long-standing cultural practice among pastoralist groups, research suggests that it has become a more predatory activity, and several studies have found that resource conflicts have increased in severity as a result of the militarization of pastoralist societies.⁴ A cattle raiding is increasingly linked to livestock trading on foreign markets and small arms proliferation, which in turn increase incentives to engage in the activity. Evidence shows that young pastoralist men are hired and armed by wealthy individuals, including livestock traders, to carry out raids and at the same time reports of raids causing loss of human lives are increasing.⁵

³ Lumborg et al., 2021; Debebe, A. (2016). Mobility and conflict: Persistent challenges in expanding access to education among pastoralists of South Omo, Ethiopia. *Ethiopian Journal of Education and Sciences*, 11(2).

⁴ Meier, P. et al. (2007). Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Political Geography*, 26(6); Hagmann, T. & Mulugeta, A. (2008). Pastoral conflicts and state-building in the Ethiopian lowlands. *Africa Spectrum*, 43(1).

⁵ Meier et al., 2007; Lumborg et al, 2021.

Very dry conditions have been found to increase both armed groups' activity and violence between pastoralists and other livelihood groups, particularly when rains are absent during Kiremt.⁶ This risk is higher in areas with existing ethno-political exclusion, where political and physical vulnerabilities can be mutually reinforcing and increase the likelihood that coping strategies take a violent form.⁷ Several studies find abundant rainfall to be associated with increased conflict risk as vegetation and resources impact armed groups' tactical considerations concerning the timing and location of attacks.⁸ For instance, increased vegetation provides cover for raiders as high grass and dense bush cover make it easier to track and ambush cattle without being caught.⁹ In order to help prevent the consequences of climate change further exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and tensions, the AU, IGAD and UN system should support efforts to identify, analyze and respond to climate-related peace and security risks.

In general, relations among Nile river riparian countries have become strained by Ethiopia's construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. An underlying factor exacerbating these tensions is increasing water scarcity in the region. Due to climate change, population growth and increasingly water-intensive agriculture, it is estimated that by 2030 the flow of the Nile-river will regularly fail to meet demand.¹⁰

The Nile river riparian states should continue to engage in dialogue, information sharing and technical cooperation, including through the Nile Basin Initiative, to lower tensions and ensure cooperative use of the Nile river resources. In decision-making and mediation processes regarding the Nile-river and its resources, as well as land use and climate adaptation mechanisms more generally, the Ethiopian Government must ensure that people's right to information about the environment and right to participate in environmental decision-making are upheld.¹¹

⁶ Fjelde, H. & von Uexkull, N. (2012). Climate triggers: Rainfall anomalies, vulnerability and communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Political Geography*, 31(7); van Weezel, S. (2019). On climate and conflict: Precipitation decline and communal conflict in Ethiopia and Kenya. *Journal of Peace Research*, 56(4).

⁷ van Weezel, 2019.

⁸ Raleigh, C. & Kniveton, D. (2012). Come rain or shine: An analysis of conflict and climate variability in East Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 49(1); Meier et al, 2007. Meier et al., 2007.

⁹ Meier et al., 2007.

¹⁰ Coffel, E.D. et al. (2019). Future hot and dry years worsen Nile Basin water scarcity despite projected precipitation increases. *Earth's Future*, 7(8).

¹¹ UN (2018). Framework principles on human rights and the environment, Principles 7, 9 & 10; African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights (1981) African charter on human and peoples' rights, Article 24.

Climate-related peace and security risks: Research has identified multiple pathways through which climate change interacts with political, social and environmental stresses to compound existing vulnerabilities and tensions.¹² While climate change is rarely the main driver of conflict, it can undermine development gains, exacerbate the dynamics influencing ongoing violence and disrupt fragile peace processes. In turn, violent conflict and political instability undermine community resilience to manage the effects of climate change.¹³

Migration and mobility: Forced displacement following droughts and floods is already affecting vulnerable communities in Ethiopia and is expected to increase in the coming years. The World Bank estimates a surge of rural-to-rural migrants due to the impacts of climate change by 2050, pointing to Addis Ababa as rural hotspot for climate-induced migration.¹⁴ This, in conjunction with the limited availability of economic resources and the effects on social cohesion, is expected to exacerbate future conflicts in receiving rural areas.¹⁵

Heightened levels of communal conflict over access to land and water following shifting politics at the federal level after the 2018 election, have led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, especially in Oromia, the Southern Nations and the outskirts of Addis Ababa.¹⁶ In Tigray and Amhara, the UN finds that large numbers of the newly displaced have contributed to exacerbating existing tensions between Amharas and Tigrayans who previously lived together in the same areas. Tensions have exacerbated as internally displaced persons (IDPs) have not been provided with adequate food, nutrition, water, healthcare or sanitation.¹⁷

Seasonal migration and mobility are fundamental for Ethiopia's 12 million pastoralists, allowing for adaptability to seasonal drought, rain and changes in weather.¹⁸ Research suggests, however, that climate change has changed some of these mobility patterns in Ethiopia. This, in combination with

¹² Moran, M. et al. (2020). Pathways of climate insecurity: Guidance for policymakers. SIPRI.

¹³ Moran, A. et al. (2018). The intersection of global fragility and climate risks. USAID; de Coning, C. & Krampe, F. (2020). Multilateral cooperation in the area of climate-related security and development risks in Africa. NUPI Report 4/2020.

¹⁴ Rigaud, K. K. et al. (2018). Groundswell: Preparing for internal climate migration. World Bank.

¹⁵ CGIAR (2021). Assessing the relationship between climate, food security and conflict in Ethiopia and the Central American dry corridor (CADC). FOCUS Climate Security.

¹⁶ Yarnell, M. (2018). The crisis below the headlines: Conflict displacement in Ethiopia. Refugees International.

¹⁷ Ethiopian Human Rights Commission & UNHCR (2021). Investigation into alleged violations of international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law committed by all parties to the conflict in the Tigray region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

¹⁸ Little, P.D. & McPeak, J. (2020). Resilience and pastoralism in Africa south of the Sahara. In S. Fan et al. (eds), Resilience for food and nutrition security. Washington D.C.

government land policies and changes to regional borders in the 1990s following decentralization, has contributed to increased instability, unpredictability and vulnerability to violent clashes.¹⁹

For example, recurrent droughts have reduced access to rangeland which has subsequently increased competition between Karrayyu and Afar herders, sometimes resulting in communal violence.²⁰ Research also finds that climate change has contributed to an increased volume of involuntary movement more widely in the Karamoja cluster area.²¹ If the impacts of climate change contribute to forcing pastoralists further into Kenya and South Sudan to seek pasture, research also suggests that increased risk of tensions might cross borders and take on an interstate nature.²²

The AU, IGAD, UN and other international partners should support government-led efforts to engage with local actors to further strengthen local knowledge and analytical capabilities to track climate impacts. These efforts should also enhance abilities to work with affected communities to prevent and manage conflict and adapt to climate change-related impacts on their mobility patterns and options. While many of the capacities needed in this area have already been identified, the resources necessary for implementation are lacking, and require additional international support.

The overall rating of security risk for the sample project areas is presented as follows; SNNP, Dire Dawa, Sidama and Oromia 5 or medium. But, when we see some security threat indicators in such as armed conflict between government and non-government forces, theft of construction materials at project site and insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas. In all the three cases, Oromia regional state has registered unacceptable/25, medium but closer to high/ 12 rating respectively.

One of the outcomes of social insecurity is the high prevalence of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). The most frequently reported form of violence related to conflict, natural disaster, water fetching, COVID-19 and other crisis is rapidly increasing SGBV in different parts of the country, so much so that SGBV has been called the “shadow pandemic”. In addition to increased

¹⁹ Hendrickson, D. et al. (1998). The changing nature of conflict and famine vulnerability: The case of livestock raiding in Turkana district, Kenya. *Disasters*, 22(3); Ayele T. et al. (2021). The impact of climate change on pastoralist livelihoods in Ethiopia: A review. *Journal of Resources, Development and Management*, 63; Kefale, A. (2010). Federal restructuring in Ethiopia: Renegotiating identity and borders along the Oromo-Somalia ethnic frontiers. *Development and Change*, 41(4).

²⁰ Hundie, B. (2010). Conflicts between Afar and their neighbors: Triggers and motivations. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 4(1).

²¹ Hundie, B. (2010). Conflicts between Afar and their neighbors: Triggers and motivations. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 4(1).

²² CGIAR, 2021.

SGBV, there is also strong evidence of general worsening of safety of women and girls, including an increased threat from human trafficking and child sexual abuse and exploitation. The evidence suggests the widespread, collective failure to protect potential victims or to consider SGBV in to initial rollout of WB financed interventions despite years of evidence from other crises, making the “shadow pandemic” an entirely predictable crisis. The rating of GBV/SEA/SH in the four sample regional states, the rating ranges from 4 up to 9. Hence, SNNP and Dire Dawa scored 4 or low rating value. On the other hand, Sidam and Oromia have a rating value of 5/ medium and 9/medium respectively.

4.4. Security Risk Assessment Identification

The Security risks threats on the HoA-GW4RP areas are grouped as follows:

- i. Internal security risk- caused by illegal, unethical or inappropriate behavior of the project staffs, temporary, part-time or seasonal employees or those directly affiliated with it.
- ii. External security risks- These may include common criminal activity; disruption of the project asset for economic, political, or social purpose; and other deliberate actions that have a negative impact on the effective, efficient, and safe operation of the proposed project. The source of security risks can be categorized into two areas:
 - a. Internal
 - Risk of GBV/SEA/SH,
 - Financial corruption,
 - OHS risk to the security personnel
 - Risk due to presence of security forces
 - Impacts from deployment of public or private security personnel
 - CHS security risks associated with the hiring of Security Personnel
 - b. External
 - Armed conflict between government and non-government forces
 - Armed robbery
 - Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas
 - Local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans
 - Theft to construction materials at a project site
 - Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair

- Abduction/Kidnapping
- Labor influx and women trafficking
- Trespassing
- Community protest
- Acts of violence
- Burglary of workplace/residence
- Arrest and detention
- Intimidation

4.5. Project Areas Potential Security Risks and Mitigation Measures

4.5.1. Potential Security Risks Identification

In rural area communities, livelihood systems can serve as a source of social instability. The encounter with rising cost of living, policy gaps, poor access to provision of services, lack of job opportunities and scarce resources has progressively exposed the vulnerability of the rural dwelling communities and it is eventually leading to social instability. The presence of undefined borders between Amhara and Tigray; Amhara and Afar, Amhara and Benishangul Gumuz; Amhara and Oromia; Oromia and SNNP; SNNP and Sidama; Benishangul Gumuz and Gambella; Afar and Somali; and among other bordering regional states is contributing to the outbreak of conflicts. This is endangering the safety and protection of individuals and natural resources in these areas. On the other hand, the presence of scarce resources and opportunities can be another driving factor. Apart from this; availability of poor basic services, high rate of unstable and unemployed youths supported by information and misinformation will pose a real danger and threat to the social cohesion of the individuals and groups in the project intervention areas.

At macro-level; the interaction among the socio-economic and political factors, climate change will play a significant negative role on solving rural poverty and implementing local economic empowerment focused interventions or programs, and subsequent multidimensional security in Ethiopia. On the other hand, security risks are also categorized in to internal and external social risks. Among the vulnerable groups the following will be majorly affected: 1) the rural poor, 2) informal workers, 3) hard to reach communities like; women, girls, elderly, children, person with disabilities, PLWHIV, victims of COVID-19 and mentally ill people; 4) refugees and internally

displaced persons; 5) petty trade workers and 6) prison populations.

At site level, there are occupational health and safety (OHS) risks to security personnel including:

- (i) risks related to traffic safety while traveling outside of the site and within the site.
- (ii) risks from unsafe ingress and egress to the site
- (iii) falling into open excavations while working near them
- (iv) risk of fall from heights such as watch towers
- (v) exposure to noise, vibration, and dust emission from the work area
- (vi) risks from working close of electricity/energy sources
- (vii) fall, slip, and trip risks due to poor housekeeping on the site
- (viii) biological hazards such as COVID-19, STDs, and pathogens from wastewater and solid waste in the work area
- (ix) Physical hazards from prolonged exposure to weather (heat, cold, rainfall, etc)
- (x) psychological stress, burnout and health effect due to the demanding nature of the work including working irregular hours
- (xi) risks associated to preparedness and response in emergency situations resulting in bodily injuries and fatalities from crimes, violence, firearm accidents, etc.
- (xii) Risks from exposure of all OHS hazards identified for project works (please see the Labor Management Procedures for detailed OHS risks).

The components which are likely to have security risks includes component 1, 2 and 3. Some of the security threats are commonly observed across the first three components. These commonly observed security threats include; access blockage to regions and woredas (especially in Oromia), risk of GBV/SEA/SH (more observed in Oromia), Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair (especially in SNNP and Oromia), burglary of work place/residence and financial corruption. Hence, six (6) types of security threats are identified as commonly observed security risks and we acknowledge the fact that there is a difference on the level

of severity and frequency across different Kebeles, Woredas and regional states. On the other hand, nine (9) security threats are associated with more conflict affected areas or areas with a potentially conflict prone areas. These include; armed robbery, armed conflict between government and non-government forces, local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans, trespassing and community protests. Though, the five security risks can be observed in all conflict prone project areas when we see in terms of the project components, they are more likely to be observed during the implementation of project components 1 and 2. The other types of security risks such as acts of violence (more to be observed in Oromia), arrest and detention, intimidation (more to be observed in Dire Dawa) and abduction (more to be observed in SNNP) are more likely to be observed in a conflict prone areas and they can be associated with all the first three components 1,2 and 3 of the project. Given that security personnel are deployed, security risk related to OHS risks to security risks will be likely to be observed on areas where these personnel are placed. Finally, security threats like theft of construction materials and labor influx and women trafficking will likely be observed on areas where components 1 and 2 of the project, especially project sub-components which involves construction activities.

4.6. Security Risk Analysis and Evaluation

For security risk analysis and evaluation, the approach involves two factors that are stated as follows. First, is the probability with which is the measure of certainty that an event, or risk, will occur. This can be measured in a number of ways, but for the HoA-GW4RP assigned a probability as defined in the Table 7 below:

Table 7: Probability of Security Risk Occurrence

Probability of Occurrences		
Likelihood (L)	Meaning	Rating
Frequent	Occurs frequently - Will be continuously experienced unless action is taken to change events	5
Likely	- Occur less frequently if process is corrected - Issues identified with minimal activity	4
Occasional	- Occurs sporadically - Potential issues discovered during focused review.	3
Seldom	- Unlikely to occur - Minimal issue identification during focused review	2
Improbable	- Highly unlikely to occur	1

Another unit of measurement in this regard is risk severity descriptions and ratings. The table that illustrates risk severity, potential triggering factors and rating number is presented below.

Table 8: Risk Security Description and Rating

Severity (S)	Potential Trigger	Rating
Critical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unrest/conflict in neighboring impacting on project activities - Ongoing operations are unsustainable and projects may be suspended for indefinite periods - Serious assault/fatality of team member; - Withdrawal of UN Support from project (or nearby), location; - Withdrawal/lack of Govt support to ensure security. 	5
High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only essential operational travel should be considered for International organizations like UN staffs - Presence of high threats against government and non-government organizations - Community unrest/conflict is high - Projects may be suspended for indefinite periods - Armed robbery at office/ activity location may be serious and impacting project activities - Serious injury/illness of project personnel due to security incidents. - Armed conflict nearby impacting project activities - GBV/SEA/SH is high 	4
Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sometimes staffs travel to project areas restricted; - Suspension of activities for short period of time; - Conflict in host and refugee community with threats of violence. - Serious injury/illness of project personnel due to security incidents. - GBV/SEA/SH risks 	3
Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrequently, there may be ethnic conflict; - Limited conflict between host and refugee communities but not affect the project; - Rarely , there may be limitation of access to target locations due to insecurity; - Security incident affecting project personnel 	2
Negligible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Agreement by community/ all stakeholders - Agreement between Project Manager and WB TTL; - There may be insignificant conflict between the host and refugee community; 	1

Potential triggers for different alert states are indicated in Annex 1.

The security risk can be calculated using the following formula risk matrix as indicated in table 9.

Relative Risk = L*S whereas, “L” stands for likelihood of occurrence and “S” stands for severity of impact

Table 9: Risk Matrix

<i>Likelihood (L)</i>	<i>Severity (S)</i>				
	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>

Note:

	<i>Critical</i>		<i>High</i>		<i>Medium</i>		<i>Low</i>		<i>Negligible</i>
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Table 10: Calculated Security Risk Value of Sample Regional States for HoA-GW4RP

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	SNNP					Dire Dawa					Sidama					Oromia				
		Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Armed robbery	5																				
	4																				
	3																				
	2		4					4													
	1														5						5
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	5																				25
	4																				
	3																				
	2		4					4													
	1														4						
Theft to construction materials at project site.	5																				
	4																				
	3									9											
	2				8															12	
	1														4						
Access blockage to some project regions and Woredas.	5																				
	4																				
	3																			12	
	2		4					4													
	1											2									
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	5																				
	4																				
	3																		9		
	2		4					4													
	1														5						
Local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans	5																				
	4																				
	3			9					9										9		
	2																				
	1														4						
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	5																				
	4																				
	3			9															9		
	2							4													
	1														5						
Trespassing	5																				
	4																				
	3																	6			
	2		4						6												
	1														4						
Community protests	5																				
	4																				

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	SNNP					Dire Dawa					Sidama					Oromia				
		Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
	3																	6			
	2		4						6												
	1											3									
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	5																				
	4																				
	3			9														9			
	2							4													
	1													5							
Acts of violence	5																				
	4																				
	3																	9			
	2							2													
	1			4									3								
Burglary of work place/residence	5																				
	4																				
	3																				
	2																	4			
	1		2					2				2									
Arrest and Detention	5																				
	4																				
	3																				
	2		4															4			
	1							2				2									
Intimidation	5																				
	4																				
	3								6												
	2		4															4			
	1												4								
Abduction	5																				
	4		8																		
	3																				
	2																	4			
	1							2				3									
Financial Corruption	5																				
	4																				
	3																				
	2																				
	1		2					1				1					1				
OHS Risks to Security Personnel	5																				25
	4																				
	3			9					9				9								
	2																				
	1																				

Based on table 10 above, the summary of relative risk level of the project is indicated in table 11 below for each project Region.

Table 11: Relative Risk Values of Sample Regional States for HoA-GW4RP

Security risks identified	SNNP	Dire Dawa	Sidama	Oromia
Armed robbery	4	4	5	5
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	4	4	4	25
Theft to construction materials at project site	8	9	4	12
Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas	4	4	2	12
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	4	4	5	9
local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans	9	9	4	9
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	9	4	5	9
Trespassing	4	6	4	6
Community protests	4	6	3	6
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	9	4	5	9
Acts of violence	4	2	3	9
Burglary of work place/residence	2	2	2	4
Arrest and Detention	4	2	2	4
Intimidation	4	6	4	4
Abduction	8	2	3	4
Financial corruption	2	1	1	1
OHS risks to security personnel	9	9	9	25
Overall rating	5	4	4	9

HoA-GW4RP is assessed overall as medium security risk of the sampled four regional states which are included in the project. The analysis identified 16 key security risks in project regions having an overall rating 0 High risk, 2 medium risks, 2 low risks, and no negligible /very low/risks. From these, we can conclude that the overall HoA-GW4RP risk is rated medium. The result indicates Oromia has registered critical rate in the case of conflict among government and non-

government forces and OHS risks on security personnel, which are 25. In the case of theft of construction materials and insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and woredas, the rating is 12 or medium. SNNP is another region with a relatively severe rating on the following three indicators; local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans, labor influx and women trafficking and unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair. It is essential to conduct Woreda/cluster level security in the case of those regions experiencing conflict or affected by conflict. Hence, certain regional states having a medium risk rating will require a special attention compared to others.

Table 12: Calculated security risk value of sample woredas for HoA-GW4RP

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	Arba Minch Zuria					Jeldessa Cluster					Shebedino					Dire				
		Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Armed robbery	5																				
	4			12																	
	3																				
	2											4									
	1									4										4	
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	5																				
	4		8																		
	3																				
	2																6				
	1									5				3							
Theft to construction materials at project site.	5																				
	4		8																		
	3																			9	
	2							4					4								
	1																				
Access blockage to some project regions and Woredas.	5																				
	4																				
	3																				
	2							4													
	1				4							3									5
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	5				20																
	4																				
	3																				
	2																			8	
	1													5							
Local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and	5									4											
	4			12																	
	3																				

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	Arba Minch Zuria					Jeldessa Cluster					Shebedino					Dire				
		Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
clans	2								6												
	1													3							5
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	5								15												
	4																				
	3			9																12	
	2																				
	1													5							
Trespassing	5																				
	4		8																		
	3																				
	2																				
	1									4				4					3		
Community protests	5																				
	4																				
	3			9																	
	2																				
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	5																				
	4					20															
	3																				
	2																				
Acts of violence	5																				
	4			12																	
	3																				
	2																			10	
Burglary of work place/residence	5																				
	4																				
	3			9																	
	2								6										6		
Arrest and Detention	5																				
	4			12																	
	3																		9		
	2																				
Intimidation	5																				
	4																				
	3																		9		
	2																				
Abduction	5			20																	
	4																				
	3																				
	2																				

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	Arba Minch Zuria					Jeldessa Cluster					Shebedino					Dire				
		Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
		1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
	2																		6		
	1									4				3							
Financial Corruption	5																				
	4	12																			
	3																				
	2																				
	1						1					1					1				
OHS risks to security personnel	5																				
	4																				
	3			9																	
	2									8			6						6		
	1																				

Based on table 12 above, the summary of relative risk level of the project is indicated in table 13 below for each project Region.

Table 13: Relative risk values of sample Woredas for HoA-GW4RP

Security risks identified	Arba Minch Zuria	Jeldesa	Shebedino	Dire
Armed robbery	12	4	4	4
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	8	5	3	6
Theft to construction materials at project site	8	4	4	9
Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas	4	4	3	5
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH	20	4	5	8
local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans	12	6	3	5
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking	9	15	5	12
Trespassing	8	4	4	3
Community protests	20	3	5	5
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	5	5	5	5
Acts of violence	12	4	5	10

Burglary of work place/residence	9	6	4	6
Arrest and Detention	12	5	3	9
Intimidation	20	4	4	9
Abduction	20	4	3	6
Financial corruption	1	1	1	1
OHS risks to security personnel	9	8	6	6
Overall rating	11	5	4	6

HoA-GW4RP is assessed overall as medium security risk project. The analysis identified 16 key security risks in project regions having 0 High risk, three medium risks, one low risk and no negligible /very low/risks. From these, we can conclude that the overall HoA-GW4RP risk is rated medium. But, in terms of the specific indicators; high rating is registered in Arba Minch Zuria woreda which is high/20 in the following indicators; risk of GBV/SEA/SH community protests, intimidation and abduction. In the case of Jeldessa cluster, high risk value is registered on labor influx and women trafficking threat which is 15. It is essential to conduct Woreda and cluster level security in the case of those regions experiencing conflict or affected by conflict.

The overall rating for the sample regional states is 6.5 or medium and in the case of Woredas it is 5.5. The average rating of the summation of the regional and woreda score is 6. Thus, the combined overall rating of the sample regional states and Woredas is 6/medium.

4.7. Security Risk Rating and Prioritization

Critical, high, medium, low, and negligible security risk ratings are assigned to activities based on their likelihood of risk occurrence and the severity of the risk. The severity column that best describes the risk result can be found using the risk matrix and relative risk value. Then, in the likelihood row, choose the best description for the possibility of the incident occurring. The risk level is indicated in the box at the intersection of the row and column. The relative risk value can be used to prioritize necessary activities for effectively managing the security risks associated with the proposed project. As a result, table 14 determines priority using the following ranges.

Table 14: Risk level and priority indicators

Risk value	Risk level	Action
21-25	Critical	Ongoing operations are unsustainable and projects may be suspended for indefinite periods. Implementation of relocation or evacuation plan, as applicable
15-20	High	It requires priority and immediate action to control the risk or to avoid minimize or treat through appropriate mitigation measures.
5-14	Medium	It requires a planned approach to control the risks and apply temporary measures if required.
2-4	Low	It may be considered as acceptable and further reduction may not necessary. However if the risk can be resolved quickly and efficiently, control measures should implemented.
1	Negligible	No need of further action

4.8. Mitigation Measures

Potentially security risks and impacts identified for the HoA-GW4RP can be avoided, minimized and mitigated in various ways. The ESMF proposes potential mitigation measures and instruments for all anticipated risks and impacts. The following are the potential measures to specifically address the security risks and impacts:

Table 15: Summary of potential security threats and mitigation measures

<i>Security Risks Identified</i>	<i>Proposed Mitigation Measures</i>	<i>Responsible Body</i>
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducting socio-economic conflict analysis to understand the root cause of border conflicts in program implementation areas. • Map out' warring factions, individuals, organizations and strategies that could help resolve border conflicts • Early identification and management of conflict Intensifying factors: ethnic conflict, recent violence, historic animosity, weakness of claimant groups (to control potential break-outs • Identify conflict 'warning signs'. Communities can make a list of warning signs that would be evidence of increasing border tensions within or between communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU at the PIT • Contracted firms • Public security Personnel • Private security personnel • woreda peace and security bureau
Armed robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Woreda program implementation unit and local public security forces • Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomotion in the area with other trusted public security actors • Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures (counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection and convey escort/protection if applicable), necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area • Suspension of program activities in program areas (located within 50 Km of the incident's place), presence of armed groups is detected. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • Local and regional officials • Local and regional security officials • Contracted firms • Program security focal person
Local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure PCO recruits, equips, and trains security forces consistent with Program SMP • Conducting socio-economic conflict analysis to understand the root cause of border conflicts in program implementation areas. • Map out' individuals, organizations and strategies that could help resolve border conflict • Early identification and management of conflict Intensifying factors: ethnic conflict, recent violence, historic animosity, weakness of claimant groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands • Local Political Officials
Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Worreda program implementation unit and local public security forces • Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomotion in the area with other trusted public security actors • Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures, necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area • Suspension of program activities in forest areas, presence of armed clash is detected. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contracted firms • Public Security Officials • Army Commands • Political Officials

Workplace injuries/safety risks, including road safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly apply the program LMP; purchase and supply of PPE materials; enforce the workplace safety features as per the OHS plan. • Awareness raising training on work-place safety cultures, including road safety • Establishment of first-aid corner or mobile first-aid boxes • Basic first-Aid training to program workers and Forest management cooperatives members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person • Regional and Woreda security office • Woreda administration • Security management team • Contractors • Consultants
Delay in procurement and public work and PPE material supply	<p>Assess and use alternatives including local markets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination with government security bodies incase their engagement and support is needed while transporting construction materials from central market place and to construction sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person • Regional and Woreda security office • Woreda administration • Security management team • Contractors • Consultants
Theft to construction materials at a project site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site access control: guidelines for security personnel on how to interact with community members seeking access to Program site or raising a concern (for example, training on the grievance mechanism and Code of Conduct). • Use of physical security personnel. • premises fencing especially materials areas, storage areas like construction sites • Establish formal and consistent reporting and communications mechanisms with local police and other security related stakeholders. • Strengthen physical security measures (fence, gate check, store lock) • Assign additional security guard in collaboration with local administration • Assessment and health and safety protocols. • Manned guarding: Entry and exit monitoring; Locking away and security marking of plant, tools and equipment, hazardous materials, etc. • Managing and operating technology which supports security, such as setting alarms and automated systems. • Training on potential hazardous materials on site, proper equipment to report events (telephone, radios, etc.), • Proper training and equipment to deal with potential events due to incurrences into construction site (e.g., fires, release of hazardous materials). • Training needed for construction workers, community workers and security personnel with each training designed for the type of worker. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda HoA-GW4RP program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator • Local police

GBV/SEA/SH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully implement sanctions contained in the GBV Action Plan (Please refer GBV Action Plan Annex 18 on the ESMF/standalone document). -Strengthen treatment and referral pathways for GBV/SEA survivors -Raise awareness on GBV/SEA protocols for the Project in line with LMP -Provide separate ablution facilities for men and women at the workplace -Ensure proper lighting on the compounds -Include SEA/SH provisions in sub-project ESMPs and C-ESMPs” to mitigation measures for GBV risks. Fully implement sanctions contained in the GBV Action Plan (Please refer GBV Action Plan Annex 18 on the ESMF/standalone document). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal, regional, woreda PMCU, and administrators Contractors and sub-contractors Implementing Agencies, Security players in the devolving government structures
Security-posed GBV Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strictly adhere to the provisions set out in the Program GBV Action Plan developed as part of the ESMF. Awareness-raising/training for security personnel (both private and public) on GBV. Awareness-raising training for women and local community members Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families. working together, referrals and collaboration with Women and social affairs bureau 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PMCU Contracted firms Public/government Security officials Woreda Women and Social Affairs bureau
Incident to project staff and project workers including physical beating and sexual harassment and GBV	<p>Awareness creation on GBV and social harassment for communities</p> <p>Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas</p> <p>Access updated information on security issues before any movement in to security risk areas</p> <p>Induct security personnel on the project’s CoC</p> <p>Ensure contracted security personnel sign the CoC</p> <p>Strengthen treatment and referral pathways for GBV/SEA survivors</p> <p>Raise awareness on GBV/SEA protocols for the Project in line with LMP and the ESF</p> <p>Provide separate facilities for men and women at the workplace</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person Regional and Woreda security office Woreda administration Security management team Contractors Consultants

	<p>Ensure proper lighting on work sites</p> <p>Fully implement measures and sanctions contained in the GBV/SEA/SH AP.</p> <p>Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adherence to requirements of the SEP, GBV/SEA/SH AP, LMP, GRM 	
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly adhere to the provisions set in Project Implementation Manual • Accessible and repeated community members consultations composing both program participant ,non-participant community members and local administration representatives • Establish and strengthen locally accessible program grievance redressing/ handling mechanism. • Designing a program membership arrangement that permits new membership opportunities vis-à-vis with certain commitment requirement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • Program social safeguard coordinators • Worreda/local administration n bureau •
Impacts from deployment of public or private security personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effecting Contractual arrangements with all involved security guards hence provide clear instructions on expected code of conduct. • Induction training to recruited security personnel, covering topics like, proportionate use of force, what constitutes sexual harassment, GBV, and program's asset management system • Documented disclosure of program's policy on firearm holding, utilization and disciplinary measures for breaches on code of conduct • Establish accessible means of receiving and reporting incidents and allegations regarding misconducts by security personnel • Adhere to WB Good Practice Note: Assessing and Managing the Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security Personnel as well as other good international practices and standards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • Contacted private security company
CHS security risks associated with the hiring of Security Personnel	<p>-Further reference shall be made to the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines to manage OHS risks to security personnel.</p> <p>-Conduct regular training and awareness project ESMF, LMP, ESHS Guidelines, OHS, safety hazards, projects for project workers, community and IAs;</p> <p>Environmental and Social Clauses for Contractors Consultation</p> <p>Adhere to Hazardous material and Wastes Management set out in the ESMF</p> <p>Adhere to Labor Management Procedures (LMP).</p> <p>Adhere to Liquid and Solid Waste Management Guideline prepared for HOA-GW4RP.</p> <p>Ensure ESHS/OHS provisions are incorporated in the bidding documents and contract agreement for construction.</p> <p>Ensure that waste management is operable to reduce the fuel element for fire</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • EPA in the devolving government structures • Regional and Woreda Administration • Labor offices • E and S specialist and Focal persons

	<p>Ensure a fire alarm/smoke alarm system is operable within the sites</p> <p>Conduct regular Environmental and Social Monitoring and audit.</p> <p>Conduct regular emergency drills at project sites in coordination with relevant local authorities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report accidents, incidents, and near misses related to OHS (Annexes 3, 4, and 5 provide incidents reporting templates). Conduct accidents root cause analysis (see Annex 6) and provide remedial measures (see Annex 7). Additional measures are provided in Annex 2 below. 	
Abduction/Kidnapping:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Use of physical security personnel, - Ensure consistent reporting and communications mechanisms with public security forces and other stakeholders. - Staff should avoid travel in darkness; only using trusted drivers / ; not set patterns and routines; keep in pairs or teams at all times. - Local knowledge of the program/subproject area and operational context must be maintained by staff at all times. - Seek information from project security focal person and clearance from PMCU coordinator. - Any event having a potential to change the security situation within program areas must always be communicated to PMCU Coordinator so that appropriate steps can be taken. - SRAMP should be made available to all staff and appropriate training conducted. - Never fight back when apprehended with armed people - Do not try to argue or make provocative comments. - Do not stare or make eye contact with the kidnappers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies • Security players in the devolving government structures • Regional and Woreda Administration
Labor influx and women trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communicate expectations regarding appropriate conduct, together with disciplinary measures; - Depending on the nature of the project, adoption of a formal code of conduct. - Prevent any kind of involuntary or compulsory labor, such as indentured labor, bonded labor, or similar labor-contracting arrangements. - No trafficked persons will be employed in connection with the project. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU, and administrators • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies, • Security players in the devolving government structures
Trespassing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources - Coordination and deconfliction with Ethiopian Defence Forces and regional armed forces - Ensure pre-departure checks are carried out ahead of all journeys - Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands • Local Political Officials

Community protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liaison with all interlocutors at all levels including government security forces, civil society, other parties to the conflict and project beneficiaries - Ensure minimum physical security measures are in place for Staff accommodation when not residing in a Humanitarian Hubs. - IDs provided for identification of staff/project personnel - Where private guards are present, training on active and hostile surveillance and managing crowds - Evacuation/relocation plan in place for HoA-GW4RP staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands • Local Political Officials
Acts of violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimize on site cash storage, keeping petty cash amounts. - Access control procedures in place as per areas SRM. - Security briefings and training. - Liaison with interlocutors including government security forces - Incident reporting process that should include local authorities - Staff constant advice on maintaining low profile - Security staff accompanying missions, when feasible. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU at the PIT • Contracted firms • Public security Personnel • Private security personnel • woreda peace and security bureau
Burglary of workplace/residence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access control in place at all sites, as far as reasonably practicable - Use of unarmed guards/ watchpeople at project sites - Asset management procedures, including inventories - Secure storage of assets, such as warehousing, as outlined in the SOPs - Seek insurance for high value items - Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management - Cultivate strong culture of incident reporting and followup 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda HoA-GW4RP program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator • Local police
Arrest and detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management - Train a crisis management from senior project leadership - Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources - Employ journey management procedures, including route and destination checks prior to departure - Use of armed escorts when specifically recommended as absolutely necessary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies • Security players in the devolving government structures • Regional and Woreda Administration
Intimidation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Constant engagement with community leaders in HoA-GW4RP operational areas. - Liaison with interlocutors including government security forces - Security briefings and adhoc training to raise situational awareness among personnel - Incident reporting process that should include local authorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies • Security players in the devolving government structures • Regional and Woreda Administration

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staff constant advice on maintaining low profile - Security staff accompanying missions, when feasible - Relocation plan in place for HoA-GW4RP and MoWE & MoIL staff 	
Financial corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staffing reforms promote competition, performance/meritbased career structures. - Disclosure of assets - Transparent appointment of qualified administrative leaders (and selection of political leaders) - Ring-fencing finances of utilities, separation of roles between local government and utilities - Support for improving integrity of business (professional associations, codes of conduct) - Demonopolizing operations and maintenance - Financial and technical audits and reporting - Performance-based contracts with defined minimum standards - Transparency in operations and management - Citizen role in oversight - Benchmarking utility performance Small/informal providers - Improve interface between formal and informal - Legitimization - Formal bulk supply, pricing, competitive tenders for franchises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda HoA-GW4RP program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator • Local police
OHS risks to security personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Employ and encourage good practices on site, such as fencing off excavations, keeping the site tidy and proper training on the use of tools - Ensure project staff are equipped with adequate PPE - When working with contractors, ensure safety obligations are captured at contracting stage - Ensure fire safety equipment and procedures are in place at all sites - Least hazardous materials should be preferred, and where necessary to use, hazardous materials must be handled and stored correctly - Safety hazards must be managed in line with WBG EHS Guidelines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • EPA in the devolving government structures • Regional and Woreda Administration • Labor offices • E and S specialist and Focal persons

Operational Security: Operational security is the essential human overview and involvement and include designated personnel to oversee; monitoring of risk management, assessment and health and safety protocols; Manned guarding; Entry and exit monitoring; Locking away and security marking of plant, tools and equipment, hazardous materials, etc.; Managing and operating technology which supports security, such as setting alarms and automated systems. For this project should also be training, training on potential hazardous materials on site, proper equipment to report events (telephone, radios, etc.), proper training and equipment to deal with potential events due to incurrences into construction site (e.g., fires, release of hazardous materials).

Further to the above, mitigation measures for OHS risks to security personnel identified in Section 4.5.1 include:

- Speed of vehicles used for security purpose should be controlled in the work area and on public roads, to the extent possible.
- Security vehicles should be operated by competent personnel.
- Flagmen should be assigned to coordinate traffic in the work area.
- Traffic signs should be used in the work area.
- Safety zones must be created in the work area with the speed of the traffic taken into account.
- Ensure that adequate ingress and egress is provided for security personnel in their duty stations and throughout the work area.
- Excavation near security personnel workstations should be provided by edge protection to prevent falling in.
- Security personnel working on watch towers and other activities involving work at height should be provided with safe access ladder/stair and a work area which is fully boarded, fitted with guard rails, toe boards, and outriggers.
- Ear plugs or mufflers should be used by security personnel to reduce high pitch noise as long as it interferes their ability to do their work. Continuous noise and vibration generating works should be limited, to extent possible. Security personnel rotation can

be considered to reduce the effect of noise on them. Similar, face masks shall be used for work activities generating dust.

- To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should be away from electricity/energy sources and lines. Where electricity/energy lines are available, there should be sufficient separation distance between the security personnel workstation and the lines. Safety signs should be provided indicating the electrical hazard.
- Housekeeping of the security personnel workstations should be maintained, at all times.
- Ensure that all waste is disposed frequently and properly, away from security personnel workstations. Security personnel should be given face masks, sanitizers, condoms, etc to protect them from transmittable diseases. Awareness creation training should be given to security personnel on prevention of transmittable diseases.
- To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should protect them from weather exposure. Provide sheds at workstations. Rotate security personnel to reduce exposure to the elements.
- Psychological stress on security personnel can be reduced through rotation and limiting the working hours.
- Security personnel who have been a victim or involved in an incident should not be left alone in the period following an incident. Psychological support should be provided, if necessary.
- Security personnel should be sufficiently trained to manage emergency situations including on emergency preparedness and response. Project security personnel should work closely with local, regional, and federal security apparatus to obtain up to date security information so that risks can be avoided or better managed.
- Security personnel should not expose themselves to danger unnecessarily and recklessly.
- Ensure quick means of communication between workers, security personnel, and government security apparatus in case of emergency. Make sure that communication equipment is always in good working conditions.
- Firearms should be kept in good condition and stored in suitable and secure locations.

- Security personnel should be well trained in handling firearms. Firearms should not be handled by other project workers.
- Security personnel should wear protective equipment, particularly those related to their work.
- Keep the number of lone and isolated workers to the minimum to handle emergency situations.
- Mitigation measures included in the project Labor Management Procedures (LMP) should be considered for the general OHS risks to project workers.
- Further reference shall be made to the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines to manage OHS risks to security personnel.

Additional measures are included in Annex 2. More detailed information on OHS mitigation measures is available in a standalone LMP document.

Training needed for construction workers, community workers and security personnel with each category of workers training designed for the type of worker. The contractor and community will arrange a more definitive approach/process including costs and effort involved for more contractual or obligatory mechanism. A training module on EHS risks including safety hazards at project sites and flooding, as well as emergency preparedness and response procedures will be also prepared. All the costs related will be considered as part of the contractual agreement and will be included. Below are General Good Practices that guides in building a construction site security plan. Also, the WBG EHS Guidelines provide further OHS requirements and measures. Additional measures are included in Annex 2.

- Establish a written Security Policy for the site.
- Develop a specific job site security plan.
- Refer the project LMP and WBG EHS Guidelines on OHS requirements and mitigation measures to include in the site security plan.
- Assign supervisory security responsibilities.
- Encourage security awareness among all workers.

- Contact the police and fire departments before starting a job to establish cooperative efforts for site security.
- Establish contact with management of adjoining properties - encourage them to report suspicious activities on the site.
- Require prompt reporting by workers of incidents of theft and vandalism.
- Report all losses to the police immediately.
- Maintain complete records of all security incidents.
- Become involved with local groups or associations working to prevent construction-site theft and vandalism.

Safety While on the Site

- When possible, enclose the job site with a security fence.
- Ensure safe ingress and egress to the site.
- Provide nighttime lighting of the site.
- Provide limited access to the site at all times, preferably with lockable gates.
- Maintain a clear zone adjacent to fencing.
- Post warning signs to help keep unauthorized persons off the site.
- Use only high quality locks – never leave keys in locks or leave locks in an open position.
- Inspect the site at the end of each day before securing it, to assure nothing has been compromised.
- Provide parking areas outside of the site for employees and visitors.
- Consider the use of security guards, and have them patrol the site on designated rounds. Provide all security guards with a means of communication.
- Consider limiting vehicle access to the site to one designated entrance through which all vehicle traffic flows.
- Consider installing a portable CCTV monitoring system to capture vehicle traffic entering and exiting the site.

Safeguarding your Equipment, Tools and Materials

- Consider utilizing a secured area within the site for equipment storage (e.g., storage trailers or sheds in secured areas).

- Ensure good housekeeping of equipment storage areas. Develop a program to maintain good housekeeping.
- Maintain an inventory control system for all equipment, tools, and materials. Include photographs of equipment and expensive tools. Establish a program for verifying all deliveries.
- Mark all tools and equipment in a conspicuous, distinctive manner to allow for easy identification.
- Consider registering high value equipment with iron watch or help tech to improve the likelihood of recovery if you are the victim of heavy equipment theft.
- Implement a checkout system for all tools and equipment. Post a sign stating, "ATTENTION! ALL TOOLS MUST BE SIGNED OUT." Also, in addition to written signs, use pictorial signages to reach people with different levels of literacy.
- Keep tools securely locked in storage trailers or sheds in secured areas.
- Stamp all heavy equipment and attachments with an ID number. Provide warning signs on equipment indicating that ID numbers are recorded.
- Establish a supervisory key control program for motorized equipment.
- Lock all equipment cabs during non-working hours.
- Immobilize equipment by disabling it or using anti-theft/anti-vandalism devices.
- Lock oil and gas tank caps, where possible, as a means of deterring vandalism.
- Park equipment centrally in a well-lit, secure area.
- Provide a secure storage area for target building materials.
- Keep the on-site inventory of materials to a minimum.
- Store equipment, materials, and tools away from perimeter fencing.
- Remove equipment and materials from the site when no longer needed – do not use the site for storage. Carefully supervise all trash removal from the site.

Strengthen the coordination with Labor and skill offices: the project office (PMCU) will closely work with different levels of labor and skill offices particularly on activities related to the assessment and implementation, monitoring and evaluation of health and safety protocols.

Manned guarding and capacity building: In all stages of the sub-project implementation (particularly during construction and operation), manned guarding is necessary to protect the

public assets and also life in case of schools, health facilities both for human and Animal. This also applies for other kind of sub-project. The project properly recognizes the importance of well-trained security guard. Thus, the project will strongly work the security guard recruited in each sub projects of all stages of the project implementation to have the required skill and knowledge including how to make inspection in Entry and exit monitoring; communication mechanisms with the nearest security (police and other security office) when additional support is needed. The public security forces are accountable to the constitution of the country for any human right abuse and excess force they use. Implementation of HoA-GW4RP witnessed that there was no significant use of security personnel, consistent with ESS 4.

- Security focal persons will be assigned at PMCU and PIT before project effectiveness.
- Security provisions for workers involved in the distribution of innovative technologies and different public work inputs.
- Hiring third party monitor(s).

5. Security Management Plan

This document is the Security Management Plan for HoA-GW4RP project. This document is intended to be a live, working document for the duration of the project implementation staffs and contract with the MoWE/PMCU of the proposed HoA-GW4RP project. It will be regularly reviewed and the content the narrative will be updated to reflect changes of note throughout the contract time. The document describes how MoWE and the PMCU manages project employees, community, properties of the contractor as well as the society's security which is according to Ethiopian Government security practice and specifies any additional or different application of controls, specifically required to the nature of contactor's services to the MoWE/PMCU and security nature of the project area.

5.1. Purpose of the Security Management Plan

The purpose of the Security Management Plan (SMP) is as follows:

- Define the scope and boundaries of the HoA-GW4RP project Security Management System;

- Document commitment by MoWE's/PMCU's management to a fit-for-purpose of project security management system;
- Document roles and responsibilities within MoWE/PMCU for the project security management system;
- Description of the major elements governing the implementation and operations of the project security management system that is required for compliance against World Bank Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs).

Therefore, MoWE/MoIL or project coordinator/his or her designate shall:

- Document and keep this SMP and update it during HoA-GW4RP-project implementation;
Evaluate the actual effectiveness of security mitigation options post-incident after exercises;
- Ensure that the prioritized security risks and impacts are taken into consideration in establishing, implementing this security management plan (SMP); and
- Evaluate the effectiveness of security risk controls and mitigation measures quarterly.

5.2. Objectives of the SMP

The Security Management Plan is designed to protect against and mitigate security risks at the project that could threaten communities, employees, facilities, and progress of HoA-GW4RP implementation. It provides direction, organization, integration, and continuity to the project security program.

The specific objectives of the Security Management Plan are the following:

- (a) Identification and assessment of security risks include an analysis of contextual factors that could cause or exacerbate human security risks in the project area.
- (b) Set the Processes of identification of different security requirements
- (c) Identify the decision-making processes of MoWE and minimum conditions for project implementation
- (e) Identify the role and responsibilities of the different parties
- (f) Sets out the operation policies, standards and institutional arrangements for the implementation of the SMP

- (g) To estimate the cost of the potential impact and its implication on the future operation;
- (h) Develop necessary SOPs (please see Annex 2), Crisis Response Protocol and security concept documents based on immediate needs; and
- (i) Undertake security, risk and safeguard trainings with relevant staff

5.3. Scope of the SMP

This SMP define the content and structure of the HoA-GW4RP project security management plan. It will also address the requirements for staff, processes, documentation, technology and physical facilities needed to meet the specific physical and personal security, governance and assurance requirements of the WB and document how these additional requirements are to be added to the MoWE's environmental, social and occupational safety.

5.4. Security Management Plan Governance

This security management plan will be prepared inline to the requirements of WB ESF, more specifically as per the requirements of Environmental and Social Standard 1 (Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts), Environmental and Social Standard 2 (Labor and Working Conditions) and Environmental and Social Standard 4 (Community Health and Safety) and the Ethiopian Labor Proclamation (proclamation No 1156/2019). Also, the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines is considered in preparing the security management plan.

5.5. Overview of Security Management Plan

Potential security risks of the Project (internal and external): Project target areas and specific project sites present different levels of insecurity and safety problems based on the security contexts and the extent of security management measures in place. It is important to undertake security risk assessment on an ongoing basis to inform mitigation measures. The purpose of security assessment is to determine and assess areas of exposure to insecurity in project workplace. For additional information, please see section 4.5.1 of the SRA of this document.

The OHS risks to security personnel include (i) risks related to traffic safety while traveling outside of the site and within the site, (ii) risks from unsafe ingress and egress to the site, (iii) falling into open excavations while working near them, (iv) risk of fall from heights such as watch

towers, (v) exposure to noise, vibration, and dust emission from the work area, (vi) risks from working close of electricity/energy sources, (vii) fall, slip, and trip risks due to poor housekeeping on the site, (viii) biological hazards such as COVID-19, STDs, and pathogens from wastewater and solid waste in the work area, (ix) Physical hazards from prolonged exposure to weather (heat, cold, rainfall, etc), (x) psychological stress, burnout and health effect due to the demanding nature of the work including working irregular hours, (xi) risks associated to preparedness and response in emergency situations resulting in bodily injuries and fatalities from crimes, violence, firearm accidents, etc., and (xii) Risks from exposure of all OHS hazards identified for project works (please see the Labor Management Procedures for detailed OHS risks).

Project Security Risk Management Capacity: Security Risk Management for the project lies under the oversight and responsibility of the project coordination unit at federal, regional and woreda level. The PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person will work closely with the regional and local government security bodies under the overall direction, supervision and control by the government existing administration. Accordingly, the project will utilize existing government security structures of implementing sectors at federal, regional, city levels. Relevant focal persons will be delegated at federal and regional levels to facilitate communications related to security concerns together with the project coordinator. Overall, the security management responsibility falls to the project coordinator and he/she may delegate to a project security manager as needed.

It is anticipated that the project will not have security involvement over and above the existing government arrangements. The institutional arrangement for SMP is presented on section 5.7., of this document. The major scenarios that may require security involvement are:

- The contractor works at specific project sites located near to the areas where law enforcement operation is undertaking
- Workers involved in the distribution of innovative technologies and different public work inputs.
- The material supply activities by private suppliers specifically in insecure sites
- The project staff movement for the purpose of technical support, follow up monitoring and evaluation
- Project resource and construction materials temporary stored at construction site and
- Project vehicles in conditions that they may be exposed to non-government armed forces

As part of this SRAMP general security risk measures have been developed. However, at this stage the specific sub project site and activity to be financed by the project is not known. Hence, by the time the specific sub project site and each activity is known, a site and activity-specific risk assessment which, in turn, will guide the security measures to be adopted will be conducted. Hence, a site-specific or project specific SMP would be prepared to guide security measures. The project coordinator and security focal persons will be responsible for this. Insecure project sites and activities may require the presence of public security personnel, which most likely to be arranged by the region, *Woreda* and kebele government to accompany the overall project operation, material supply and staff movement.

5.6. Security Management Procedures for HoA-GW4RP

The SRM process is an approach to evaluate security risks to ensure that a harmonized threat and risk analysis leads to effective security decision-making and to the implementation of SRM measures. SRM measures are identified after specific threats and risks are identified so that mitigation or prevention measures are proposed for implementation. SRM measures may include training and awareness creation, information, situation updates, physical improvements to facilities or procedural changes. SRM measures need to be linked to the preceding security risk assessment assisting to reduce either the likelihood or the impact of an event. HoA-GW4RP will use the following risk management procedures while implementing the project operation in identified security potential areas.

1. Training and awareness creation;
2. Management of site work and staff movement
3. Use of Government security personnel
4. Equipment and project assets
5. Physical security
6. Response to different security alert levels (see Annex 1)
7. Suspension of activities
8. Emergency preparedness and response.

5.7. Oversight and Security Management

The responsibility for overseeing security risk management of HoA-GW4RP operation will be vested on the federal, regional and *Woreda* Project Focal Unit/PFU and contractors are responsible to ensure the safety and security of contracted workers and construction materials at sub project construction sites including reporting on any security concerns occurred at construction sites. The overall responsibility for overseeing project security rests on project coordinator and security focal person (Security Manager) at federal level and security focal persons for each of the regions. In collaboration with administrative bodies, the PFU at all levels will be responsible for coordinating the overall project management through the existing government structure in fulfilling security safeguards requirements. Specifically, the PFU will be responsible for:

- Undertaking site and activity specific security risk assessment and implementation of this Security Risk Management Plan;
- As part of sub-project screening, undertake security risk assessment and recommend mitigation measures;
- Ensure that security mitigation measures are included in sub-project ESMPs;
- Monitor potential security risks on sub-project sites together with the local government
- Initiate response procedures based on the security risk alert level (Annex 1 provides different security alert states and potential triggers).
- Provide training for concerned stakeholders to mitigate social risks of project workers and equipment including security risks;
- Ensure that project Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) established for the project and implemented and that project workers are informed about the GRM procedure;
- Report periodically to the World Bank on the implementation of the SRAMP.

In order to guide the overall activity of SMP, the organizational chart for the implementation of the SMP is present on the figure below:




Figure 5.7: Organizational responsibility chart for the implementation of security management plan.

5.8. Communication Protocols

Standard telecommunication connection facilities, which are within the scope of the project, will be the main means of communication method to be used during the implementation of this SRAMP. This includes office telephone, mobile phone, and email, and fax communications. In case of remote areas where it is difficult to access the normal network and emergency cases including travel to field locations, the project will use other methods of communication (i.e. GSM & sat phone/VHF radio) through fulfilling the required country's security requirements. Virtual

communication options with PIT and Woreda project coordination team will be strengthened during restrictions of movement.

5.9. Grievance Redress Mechanism

To extent possible, the SMP will adopt the Project Grievance Redress Mechanism in managing the security related grievances. The security manager shall engage the relevant project personnel to ensure security personnel grievances are included in the Project GRM and Stakeholder Engagement Plan, and work with public security leaders to integrate the project GRM with internal procedures. Key areas of emphasis will be on the following steps:

Establish a grievance mechanism to receive security-related concerns or complaints: It is important to have a structured and accessible process for receiving and responding to security-related complaints and to ensure that affected community members are aware of it. In general, concerns may come from a wide range of sources including communicated directly to Community Relations staff, kebele level-compliant handling committee, through a hotline telephone number, via tip boxes outside the program site, and suggestion boxes placed at sector bureau which are being involved in program implementation.

Clarify reporting requirements and structure: Good procedures normally specify which type of security-related allegations and incidents should be reported, to whom, and in what time frame. Complaint handling Procedures should clearly identify both the person(s) responsible for accepting and processing allegations or incidents, and escalation hierarchy to management.

Develop inquiry protocols: In addition to a routine process for recording all incidents, more serious incidents or allegations related to security personnel conduct may require a more in-depth inquiry to determine whether policies and procedures were strictly followed and if any corrective, disciplinary, or preventive actions are warranted.

5.9.1. Key Steps in Security-Related GRM Process

Every allegation or incident related to security should be assessed, regardless of whether in a low-risk or high-risk context. The level of depth and detail of inquiry should flow from the seriousness of the allegation or incident. The steps involving the GRM process are further discussed as follows.

Step One: Record the incident or allegation: All incidents and allegations should be recorded, whether they come from an incident report, the grievance mechanism, or any other formal or

informal means of communication. Serious allegations and incidents should be reported to senior management within the same day acts committed. Potentially criminal wrongdoing such as theft, rape/attempt of rape, carjacking, GBV, fire break-out should be reported to the relevant authorities within 24 hours. Security incidents must be reported to the WB within 24 hours and a detailed report submitted within 15 days. Annex 4 provides Sample Incident Report Summary Template.

Step Two: Collect information promptly: Information should be collected as early as possible following an incident or receipt of an allegation. This may include noting details related to the circumstance, individuals involved, location, timing, and so forth, and taking statements and/ or photographs where relevant.

Step Three: Protect confidentiality: PMCU is advised to consider confidentiality measures to protect alleged victims, witnesses, and/or complainants—for example, identifying them by numbers instead of names. Victims, witnesses, complainants, and other interviewees should be informed as to whether and how their identities will be protected and whether their names will be recorded and/or used.

Step Four: Assess the allegation or incident and conduct further inquiry, if warranted: After receiving and recording an allegation or incident report, PMCU typically assess the seriousness and credibility of the claim against existing security policies and procedures to determine any noncompliance by security personnel and whether further investigation is needed. A more in-depth inquiry should be conducted in cases of serious allegations or incidents, such as instances of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel, and/or where severe impacts result from a security incident, such as injury, sexual violence, use of lethal force, or fatalities. Behavior that may be considered criminal should be referred to the relevant authorities.

Step Five: Document the process: The allegation or incident and the inquiry process should be documented, including sources of information, evidence, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. Where it is not possible to reach a conclusion (for example, due to limited or contradictory information or evidence), the efforts being made should be stated clearly along with any efforts to fill gaps and make further assessment. It is good practice for information related to security allegations or incidents to be classified and handled as confidential. Any report should be objective, impartial, and fact-based.

Step Six: Report any unlawful act: Potentially criminal wrong doings or unlawful acts of any security personnel (whether employees, contractors, or public security forces) should be reported

to the appropriate authorities (using judgment about reporting in cases where there are legitimate concerns about treatment of persons in custody). PMCU is advised to cooperate with criminal investigations and ensure that internal processes and inquiries do not interfere with government-led proceedings.

Step Seven: Take corrective action to prevent recurrence: Action should be taken to ensure that negative impacts are not repeated. This may entail corrective and/or disciplinary action to prevent or avoid recurrence, if the incident was not handled according to instructions. In general, PMCU is encouraged to identify lessons learned from the incident and take the opportunity to revise internal company policies and practices as needed.

Step Eight: Monitor and communicate outcomes: Since PMCU or contracted organizations (PCO) are controlling their own internal processes, they could help ensuring consideration of any allegation or incident is professional and progresses at a reasonable pace. Additional oversight may be needed with regard to third-party inquiries, such as those undertaken by private security providers. PMCU and PCO are encouraged to actively monitor the status of any ongoing criminal investigations led by government authorities.

It is also be good practice to communicate outcomes to complainants and other relevant parties, keeping in mind confidentiality provisions and the need to protect victims. Where appropriate, it can also be constructive to share relevant lessons learned and any efforts to incorporate these into company policy and/or practice.

5.9.2. Procedures to manage risks of sexual harassment from security personnel

Special gender considerations are so important in sexual exploitation and abuse related security risks, as women often have different experiences and interactions with security personnel. For example, the potential for sexual harassment or sexual violence against women can increase from an expanded presence of private or public security forces in a project area. Thus, consulting women separately may offer important perspectives and may help companies identify a fuller range of potential risks and community concerns. At the same time, security personnel's awareness of and respect for culturally specific gender issues may help the local population accept their presence.

Before engaging to the security service provision, each of employed or contracted security guards or public security personnel deemed to be deployed in project area, shall take GBV related induction training and shall capture some awareness on what constitute a sexual harassment or

abuse. Moreover he/she has also must be briefed, understand and sign program's sexual exploitation and abuse code of conduct, which will be part of the employment contract.

If gender-based violence or sexual exploitation and abuse allegations are egressed on public or private program security personnel or do issues arise from public report or are alleged during project implementation or supervision, PMCU project social safeguard expertise must be alerted immediately. Project gender expertise is also advised to consult the Bank's Good Practice Note and Project SMP on Recommendations for Addressing Gender-based Violence involving security personnel. Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families.

5.9.3 Measures to Manage OHS Risks to Security Personnel

The following measures are recommended risks to security personnel:

- Speed of vehicles used for security purpose should be controlled in the work area and on public roads, to the extent possible.
- Security vehicles should be operated by competent personnel.
- Flagmen should be assigned to coordinate traffic in the work area.
- Traffic signs should be used in the work area.
- Safety zones must be created in the work area with the speed of the traffic taken into account.
- Ensure that adequate ingress and egress is provided for security personnel in their duty stations and throughout the work area.
- Excavation near security personnel workstations should be provided by edge protection to prevent falling in.
- Security personnel working on watch towers and other activities involving work at height should be provided with safe access ladder/stair and a work area which is fully boarded, fitted with guard rails, toe boards, and outriggers.
- Ear plugs or mufflers should be used by security personnel to reduce high pitch noise as long as it interferes their ability to do their work. Continuous noise and vibration generating works should be limited, to extent possible. Security personnel rotation can be considered to reduce the effect of noise on them. Similar, face masks shall be used for work activities generating dust.

- To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should be away from electricity/energy sources and lines. Where electricity/energy lines are available, there should be sufficient separation distance between the security personnel workstation and the lines. Safety signs should be provided indicating the electrical hazard.
- Housekeeping of the security personnel workstations should be maintained, at all times.
- Ensure that all waste is disposed frequently and properly, away from security personnel workstations. Security personnel should be given face masks, sanitizers, condoms, etc to protect them from transmittable diseases. Awareness creation training should be given to security personnel on prevention of transmittable diseases.
- To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should protect them from weather exposure. Provide sheds at workstations. Rotate security personnel to reduce exposure to the elements.
- Psychological stress on security personnel can be reduced through rotation and limiting the working hours.
- Security personnel who have been a victim or involved in an incident should not be left alone in the period following an incident. Psychological support should be provided, if necessary.
- Security personnel should be sufficiently trained to manage emergency situations including on emergency preparedness and response. Project security personnel should work closely with local, regional, and federal security apparatus to obtain up to date security information so that risks can be avoided or better managed.
- Security personnel should not expose themselves to danger unnecessarily and recklessly.
- Ensure quick means of communication between workers, security personnel, and government security apparatus in case of emergency. Make sure that communication equipment is always in good working conditions.
- Firearms should be kept in good condition and stored in suitable and secure locations.
- Security personnel should be well trained in handling firearms. Firearms should not be handled by other project workers.
- Security personnel should wear protective equipment, particularly those related to their work.
- Keep the number of lone and isolated workers to the minimum to handle emergency situations.

- Mitigation measures included in the project Labor Management Procedures (LMP) should be considered for the general OHS risks to project workers.
- Further reference shall be made to the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines to manage OHS risks to security personnel.

5.10. Performance Monitoring and Reporting

Prepare and submit to the PMCU/PIT regular monitoring reports on the SRM performance of the Project, including but not limited to the implementation of this SRMP; status of preparation and implementation of risk management documents required under the ESCP; stakeholder engagement activities; and functioning of the grievance mechanism(s).

5.10.1. Site Visits

The City level safeguards focal person along with federal and regional level experts in the PMCU and PIT should plan for and implement site visits to monitor Project security risks and arrangements. The frequency of the site visits may be determined as necessary, but annual visit is the minimum requirement. To track program security performance, site visit will use different modalities of collecting information including:

Schedule meetings with key personnel: As part of scheduling meetings and the required Security Briefings, ensure that relevant site management personnel are included to be able to provide and discuss security-related information, including: (a) City project coordinators, Program/Site Manager, worreda/cluster safeguard focal persons (who has overall responsibility for program risks); (b) Security coordinators, Protection Manager (or person responsible for security); (c) Community Relations Manager; (d) civil societies and private actors and (e) Human Resources Manager, Environment and Safety Manager.

Request assistance in arranging meetings with external stakeholders, including, as appropriate: (a) Public Security representatives, where possible and appropriate (e.g., local senior police officer, local militia, regional special force military commander, etc.), (b) Local public authorities (head of city administration, city peace and security officers; etc.); (c) Municipal authorities; and (d) Local community members: Seek information on community members' concerns, where possible. If the topic of security personnel may be raised, it is good practice to not have security personnel present

during meetings with community members or civil society, even if this means that a meeting location needs to be switched to a more neutral location; (e) Reiterate the commitment to the Code of Conduct (See Annexes 8 and 9) and grievance mechanisms.

Observations on site: Site visits provide the opportunity for many useful observations about security status, while arriving at and moving around the site. There should be an advance briefing about the program activities, sites, and security issues that may help focus questions and observations.

The above means of collecting on-site information for monitoring security management involve asking questions of many different stakeholders. This can help gain new information as well as confirm previously collected information or insights. Site-visit questions during program implementation should aim to assess understanding of the essential elements of the security arrangement prepared for a specific Bank program (e.g. any codes of conduct, training content, protocol of security responses, reporting procedure), what security response has been to past incidents, and issues in implementing the security arrangement/security management plan.

5.10.2 Oversight

MoWE/PMCU and any Contracted Organization, as part of their oversight responsibilities, should monitor site performance of their security personnel on an ongoing basis to ensure professional and appropriate conduct. This may include reviewing policies and materials, undertaking periodic audits, potentially assisting with or supporting training, and considering any allegations of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel. Speaking to program employees and local community members who come into regular contact with security staff can also provide valuable insights to monitoring the performance of program security management.

5.10.3 Joint Implementation Supervision Mission (JISM)

The SMP should be reviewed during supervision missions by the program implementing entities and the development partners. Depending on the assessment of program security performance, appropriate corrective actions may be proposed. As part of program supervision, the World Bank staff review incident reports submitted to the Bank, and grievance mechanism logs regarding grievances or allegations that involve project-related security personnel.

Security-related allegations or incidents can include issues such as theft, abuse of power and retaliation, sexual harassment and exploitation, gender-based violence, and bribery and corruption. Bank staff should request more information about any reported incidents and steps taken to address the issue and prevent recurrence and should promptly keep Bank management informed of allegations or instances of violence or abuse and the remedial efforts. Allegations or incidents related to security personnel should be documented and assessed with the objective of determining compliance or noncompliance with policies and procedures and whether any corrective or preventive actions are required.

If gender-based violence or sexual exploitation and abuse issues arise or are alleged during project implementation or supervision, Bank Management must be alerted immediately. Bank staffs are advised to consult the Bank's Good Practice Note on Recommendations for Addressing Gender-based Violence and shall also discuss the issue with specialized social development staff. Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families.

5.10.4. Independent Security Audit

The Security management plan should be reviewed during supervision missions by the Bank. Depending on the assessment of the program security performance, an independent security audit may be proposed for basic corrective measures. Besides, significant changes in the program's security situation should be reported immediately to the Bank. Depending on the nature and severity of security impacts, an independent security audit may be undertaken which will allow for the necessary changes/updates to the SMP or ESCP.

At this initial stage of the program, an independent security audit timeline is suggested to be every six-month period of program operation, which then could be scheduled annually for later stage of program operation. Where incidents or grievances regarding security have been identified, the risk profile of the program may need to be changed, and Bank's supervision may need to increase, such as more frequent monitoring trips or the use of third-party monitoring.

5.10.5. Communicating the Outcome of Complaints

Project staff responsible for program SEP and Grievance Mechanism should communicate outcomes to complainants and other relevant parties, keeping in mind confidentiality provisions and the need to protect victims from further incidents or retaliation. Where appropriate, it can also

be constructive to share relevant lessons learned with the community and any changes made to prevent future incidents.

5.11 Managing Public or Government Security Engagement

Public security forces involvement in HoA-GW4RP site shall only be encouraged on special demanding circumstances and they should not be involved in protecting specific program activities on a regular basis. The involvement of public security shall only be considered only for typically broader-community context level instabilities or fragile security conditions. Because of this, public security forces involvement in HoA-GW4RP sites could typically be driven by:

The request of the MoWE/PMCU, due to a perceived increase in the security threat level, for example, in program areas with instable, fragile and conflict situation; risk of attacks from armed insurgents, instances of road closure by ethnic/border conflicts Ethiopia demand or put as a requirement. Generally, the program related security issues are encouraged to rely first on project-owned or contracted individual security forces to solve site security problems, not think of public security forces as a priority or as a replacement for contracted security forces. But, if this option fails, the GoE or the regional government may require deploying public security.

Option of working with public security forces can be the most challenging aspect of security management for PMCU, as it do not control the decisions of public security personnel or may have limited influence in this regard. For this reason, the engagement of public security in HoA-GW4RP should take the following key management-considerations. As part of the ESS4, following the risk assessment a suitable mitigation measure is put in place.

5.11.1. Signing a Memorandum of Understanding

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) is a formal, written agreement between the PMCU and concerned woreda/regional government authorities and commanding unit of the local/regional/federal security forces. The MoU should establish and document agreed key expectations and decision-making processes and procedures with regard the engagement of public security personnel. It allows PMCU, local government and public security forces to delineate their respective roles,

There are many different ways to construct the MoU. In general, it is recommended that: (a) the MoU include references to program SMP, national laws, WB's ESSs and other applicable

international laws such as relevant UN protocols; (b) the MoU typically includes any financial or resourcing issues (such as housing, food, stipends, transportation, and the like); and (c) where possible, it is recommended that PMCU includes a provision allowing them to request the removal of individual public security personnel from their area of operations. It will also include a project code of conduct, focusing on human rights and well managed use of force.

5.11.2. Communication and engagement with public security

MoWE/PMCU is advised to communicate their principles of conduct to public security forces and express their desire that the security provided be consistent with those standards. The degree and formality of this communication may vary according to the security risks and the nature (and appropriateness) of the security arrangements involving public security personnel. PMCU should keep a record of any communication or communication attempts with public security personnel. It shall also develop or establish a functional activity/incidence reporting mechanism for other relevant stakeholders (see Annexes 3, 4, and 5 for incident reporting templates).

Low-risk contexts: If the number, type, and nature of the deployment appears appropriate and proportional to the assessed risks, PMCU may wish, at a minimum, to simply maintain contact and communication through check-ins with public security forces to help the program be confident that police will respond quickly and professionally if an incident occurs, or that suspects (including community members) caught trespassing or stealing will be treated fairly in police custody.

High-risk contexts: In high-risk contexts, having a more formalized and established relationship can be central to ensuring that any potentially tense and dynamic situations do not escalate to become even more volatile due to police or military involvement. The situation can be exacerbated if the risk of excessive force by public security personnel seems high.

Proper handover: When public security is needed to protect program workers and property, there should be a proper handover of control from contracted/private employed security guards to public security and a way to manage handing the control back when the situation is stabilized. This can be a good topic to start a discussion, because it focuses on public security's legitimate role and on assuring the greatest effectiveness and safety.

5.12. The Estimated cost of risk mitigation and prevention measures for the project

Table 16: Security Management Budget

Item	Cost-USD	Frequency
Project security manager	24,000	Annual
Training	250	Per person
Fire safety equipment	200	Per site
Guarding Services including guard equipment (if applicable)	2,000	Monthly/per site
First Aid Kit	100	Per site
Hibernation Kits	250	Per Office/site
Physical security measures (e.g. locks, doors, safes, window grills)	4,000	Per Office/site
Independent security audit	5,000	Per field visit
Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT)	5000	Along the project implementation
Other security measures (e.g. fencing, lighting, signages, monitoring system, PPE)	5,000	Per site

Table 17: Summary of risks and management framework for SRA MP

Risks	Management Plan	Risk Rating	Budget Timeframe	Responsible body
Institutional instability affecting human and material safety as a result of law enforcement operation (frequently moving to safe place, staff turnover and poor working environment)	<p>Undertake site specific security risk assessment to update security information</p> <p>Staff movement in insecure areas shall be accompanied with government security personnel</p> <p>Provide awareness creation and capacity building training on security risk management for project workers, contractors, community workers, suppliers and other stakeholders working at areas with security problem</p> <p>Pause project operations temporary in areas with significant security problem. Acceptable conditions for the resumption of activities will be agreed by the PMCU and PIT and documented in advance.</p> <p>Undergo plan revision and budget reallocation</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p>
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces	<p>Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Woreda program implementation unit and local public security forces</p> <p>Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomotion in the area with other trusted public security actors</p> <p>Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures (counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection and convey escort/protection if applicable), necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area</p> <p>Suspension of program activities in program areas (located within 50 Km of the incident's place), presence of armed groups is detected.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU at the PIT</p> <p>Contracted firms</p> <p>Public security Personnel</p> <p>Private security personnel</p> <p>woreda peace and security bureau</p>
Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and Woredas	<p>Use alternative means of transportation, for example air transportation for project staff</p> <p>Seek the support of government security personnel proportionate to the level of risk (regional special force, city police officers and</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p>

	<p>kebele milisha) for obligatory movements to security problem sites</p> <p>Government security forces deployed for project use will operate as per MoU signed with the project and be bound by project code of conduct (see Annexes 8 and 9) and rules on the use of force.</p>			Woreda administration
Robbery to project assets including office equipment, office furniture, cars and motor cycles	<p>Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas</p> <p>Strengthening virtual communication options with RPMCU using standard connection options (internet and cell phone) which are within the scope of the project.</p> <p>Strengthen physical security measures (fence, gate check)</p> <p>Continuous information exchange with government security bodies</p> <p>Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force)</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p> <p>Security management team</p>
Theft to construction materials at project site	<p>Strengthen physical security measures (fence, gate check, store lock)</p> <p>Assign additional security guard in collaboration with local administration</p> <p>Assessment and health and safety protocols.</p> <p>Manned guarding: Entry and exit monitoring; Locking away and security marking of plant, tools and equipment, hazardous materials, etc.</p> <p>Managing and operating technology which supports security, such as setting alarms and automated systems.</p> <p>Training on potential hazardous materials on site, proper equipment to report events (telephone, radios, etc.),</p> <p>Proper training and equipment to deal with potential events due to incurrences into construction site (e.g., fires, release of hazardous materials).</p> <p>Training needed for construction workers, community workers and security personnel with each training designed for the type of worker.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p> <p>Security management team</p> <p>Contractors</p> <p>Consultants</p>

Delay in procurement and public work and PPE material supply	<p>Assess and use alternatives including local markets</p> <p>Coordination with government security bodies incase their engagement and support is needed while transporting construction materials from central market place and to construction sites</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p> <p>Security management team</p> <p><i>Contractors</i></p>
Incident to project staff and project workers including physical beating and sexual harassment and GBV	<p>Awareness creation on GBV and social harassment for communities</p> <p>Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas</p> <p>Access updated information on security issues before any movement in to security risk areas</p> <p>Induct security personnel on the project's CoC</p> <p>Ensure contracted security personnel sign the CoC</p> <p>Strengthen treatment and referral pathways for GBV/SEA survivors</p> <p>Raise awareness on GBV/SEA protocols for the Project in line with LMP and the ESF</p> <p>Provide separate facilities for men and women at the workplace</p> <p>Ensure proper lighting on work sites</p> <p>Fully implement measures and sanctions contained in the GBV/SEA/SH AP.</p> <p>Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force)</p> <p>Adherence to requirements of the SEP, GBV/SEA/SH AP, LMP, GRM</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person</p> <p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p> <p>Security management team</p> <p><i>Contractors</i></p> <p><i>Consultants</i></p>
Weak and ineffective grievance redress	Strengthening and awareness creation and training will be provided for Grievance Redress Committee	Medium	Throughout the project	RPMCU and Project Focal Unit, Woreda administration

processes	<p>Adherence to requirements of the SEP, GBV/SEA/SH AP, LMP, GRM</p> <p>-GRM committees in all 127 woredas</p>		implementation	
Conflict among local communities/inter-ethnic conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understand and mitigate the underlying cause's competition/conflicts. Address security risks with a social solution (e.g. reduce community members' trespassing to gain access to project resources source by providing a well-designed work protocol and procedure). Ensure that community members have access to program grievance mechanism. Conducting socio-economic conflict analysis to understand the root cause of local or inter-ethnic conflicts in program implementation areas. Map out' individuals, organizations and strategies that could help resolve local community conflicts Early identification and management of conflict Intensifying factors: ethnic conflict, recent violence, historic animosity, weakness of claimant groups (to control potential break-outs Ensure PCO recruits, equips, and trains security forces consistent with Program SMP 	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU, RPMCU and PFU</p> <p>Contracted firms</p> <p>Public security Personnel</p> <p>Private security personnel</p> <p>Woreda peace and security bureau</p>
Armed robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Woreda program implementation unit and local public security forces Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomotion in the area with other trusted public security actors Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures (counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection and convey escort/protection if applicable), necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area 	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU and RPMCU</p> <p>Public Security Officials and Army Commands</p> <p>Local Political Officials</p> <p>Security management team</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suspension of program activities in intervention areas, presence of armed groups within 50Km radius of the project implementation area is detected. 			
Impacts from deployment of public or private security personnel	<p>Effecting Contractual arrangements with all involved security guards hence provide clear instructions on expected code of conduct (see Annexes 8 and 9).</p> <p>Induction training to recruited security personnel, covering topics like, proportionate use of force, what constitutes sexual harassment, GBV, and program's asset management system</p> <p>Documented disclosure of program's policy on firearm holding, utilization and disciplinary measures for breaches on code of conduct (see Annexes 8 and 9).</p> <p>Establish accessible means of receiving and reporting incidents and allegations regarding misconducts by security personnel</p> <p>The Project will be guided by the National Laws while addressing security concerns. The World Bank's ESF provides for possible mitigation measures for security personnel engaged in Bank financed projects which include the following:</p> <p>Monitor risks resulting from acts of security personnel;</p> <p>Manning sub-project sites;</p> <p>Make reasonable inquiries to verify that the direct or contracted workers providing security are not implicated in past abuses;</p> <p>Raise awareness to contracted security personnel or determine that they are properly trained in the use of force and appropriate conduct towards workers and affected communities;</p> <p>Review allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel;</p> <p>Ensure security personnel contracted under the project are inducted on and sign the CoC.</p> <p>Report incidents related to use of security personnel.</p> <p>MoU will be signed (where applicable).</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	PMCU and RPMCU Contacted private security company Security management team

CHS security risks associated with the hiring of Security Personnel	<p>-Further reference shall be made to the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines to manage OHS risks to security personnel.</p> <p>-Conduct regular training and awareness project ESMF, LMP, ESHS Guidelines, OHS, safety hazards, projects for project workers, community and IAs;</p> <p>Environmental and Social Clauses for Contractors Consultation</p> <p>Adhere to Hazardous material and Wastes Management set out in the ESMF</p> <p>Adhere to Labor Management Procedures (LMP).</p> <p>Adhere to Liquid and Solid Waste Management Guideline prepared for HOA-GW4RP.</p> <p>Ensure ESHS/OHS provisions are incorporated in the bidding documents and contract agreement for construction.</p> <p>Ensure that waste management is operable to reduce the fuel element for fire</p> <p>Ensure a fire alarm/smoke alarm system is operable within the sites</p> <p>Conduct regular Environmental and Social Monitoring and audit.</p> <p>Conduct regular emergency drills at project sites in coordination with relevant local authorities.</p> <p>Report accidents, incidents, and near misses related to OHS (Annexes 3, 4, and 5 provide incidents reporting templates). Conduct accidents root cause analysis (see Annex 6) and provide remedial measures (see Annex 7).Additional measures are provided in Annex 2 below.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>Federal, regional, woreda PMCU</p> <p>Contractors and sub-contractors</p> <p>EPA in the devolving government structures</p> <p>Regional and Woreda Administration</p> <p>Labor offices</p> <p>E and S specialist and Focal persons</p>
GBV/SEA/SH	<p>Induct security personnel on the project's CoC and ensure contracted security personnel sign the CoC</p> <p>Strengthen treatment and referral pathways for GBV/SEA survivors</p> <p>Raise awareness on GBV/SEA protocols for the Project in line with LMP</p> <p>Provide separate ablution facilities for men and women at the workplace</p> <p>Ensure proper lighting on the compounds</p> <p>Fully implement sanctions contained in the GBV Action Plan (Please refer GBV Action Plan Annex 18 on the ESMF).</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>Federal, regional, woreda PMCU, and administrators</p> <p>Contractors and sub-contractors</p> <p>Implementing Agencies,</p> <p>Security players in the devolving government structures</p>
Incident to project staff and project workers including physical beating and	Awareness creation on GBV and social harassment for communities	Medium	Throughout the project	PMCU, PIT and Woreda level focal person

sexual harassment and GBV	<p>Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas</p> <p>Access updated information on security issues before any movement in to security risk areas</p> <p>Induct security personnel on the project's CoC</p> <p>Ensure contracted security personnel sign the CoC</p> <p>Strengthen treatment and referral pathways for GBV/SEA survivors</p> <p>Raise awareness on GBV/SEA protocols for the Project in line with LMP and the ESF</p> <p>Provide separate facilities for men and women at the workplace</p> <p>Ensure proper lighting on work sites</p> <p>Fully implement measures and sanctions contained in the GBV/SEA/SH AP.</p> <p>Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force)</p> <p>Adherence to requirements of the SEP, GBV/SEA/SH AP, LMP, GRM</p>		implementation	<p>Regional and Woreda security office</p> <p>Woreda administration</p> <p>Security management team</p> <p>Contractors</p> <p>Consultants</p>
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair	<p>•Strictly adhere to the provisions set in Project Implementation Manual</p> <p>Accessible and repeated community members consultations composing both program participant ,non-participant community members and local administration representatives</p> <p>Establish and strengthen locally accessible program grievance redressing/ handling mechanism.</p> <p>Designing a program membership arrangement that permits new membership opportunities vis-à-vis with certain commitment requirement</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>PMCU</p> <p>Program social safeguard coordinators</p> <p>Woreda/local administration n bureau</p>
Abduction/Kidnapping:	<p>Use of physical security personnel,</p> <p>Ensure consistent reporting and communications mechanisms with public security forces and other stakeholders.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>Federal, regional, woreda PMCU</p> <p>Contractors and sub-contractors</p>

	<p>Staff should avoid travel in darkness; only using trusted drivers / ; not set patterns and routines; keep in pairs or teams at all times.</p> <p>Local knowledge of the program/subproject area and operational context must be maintained by staff at all times.</p> <p>Seek information from project security focal person and clearance from PMCU coordinator.</p> <p>Any event having a potential to change the security situation within program areas must always be communicated to PMCU Coordinator so that appropriate steps can be taken.</p> <p>SRAMP should be made available to all staff and appropriate training conducted.</p> <p>Never fight back when apprehended with armed people</p> <p>Do not try to argue or make provocative comments.</p> <p>Do not stare or make eye contact with the kidnappers.</p>			<p>Implementing Agencies</p> <p>Security players in the devolving government structures</p> <p>Regional and Woreda Administration</p>
<p>OHS risks to security personnel</p>	<p>-Speed of vehicles used for security purpose should be controlled in the work area and on public roads, to the extent possible.</p> <p>-Security vehicles should be operated by competent personnel.</p> <p>-Flagmen should be assigned to coordinate traffic in the work area.</p> <p>-Traffic signs should be used in the work area.</p> <p>-Safety zones must be created in the work area with the speed of the traffic taken into account.</p> <p>-Ensure that adequate ingress and egress is provided for security personnel in their duty stations and throughout the work area.</p> <p>-Excavation near security personnel workstations should be provided by edge protection to prevent falling in.</p> <p>-Security personnel working on watch towers and other activities involving work at height should be provided with safe access ladder/stair and a work area which is fully boarded, fitted with guard rails, toe boards, and outriggers.</p> <p>-Ear plugs or mufflers should be used by security personnel to reduce high pitch noise as long as it interferes their ability to do their work. Continuous noise and vibration generating works should be limited, to extent possible. Security personnel rotation can be considered to reduce the effect of noise on them. Similar, face masks shall be used for work activities generating dust.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<p>Federal, regional, woreda PMCU</p> <p>Contractors and sub-contractors</p> <p>EPA in the devolving government structures</p> <p>Regional and Woreda Administration</p> <p>Labor offices</p> <p>E and S specialist and Focal persons</p>

	<p>-To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should be away from electricity/energy sources and lines. Where electricity/energy lines are available, there should be sufficient separation distance between the security personnel workstation and the lines. Safety signs should be provided indicating the electrical hazard.</p> <p>-Housekeeping of the security personnel workstations should be maintained, at all times.</p> <p>-Ensure that all waste is disposed frequently and properly, away from security personnel workstations. Security personnel should be given face masks, sanitizers, condoms, etc to protect them from transmittable diseases. Awareness creation training should be given to security personnel on prevention of transmittable diseases.</p> <p>-To the extent possible, security personnel workstations should protect them from weather exposure. Provide sheds at workstations. Rotate security personnel to reduce exposure to the elements.</p> <p>-Psychological stress on security personnel can be reduced through rotation and limiting the working hours.</p> <p>-Security personnel who have been a victim or involved in an incident should not be left alone in the period following an incident. Psychological support should be provided, if necessary.</p> <p>-Security personnel should be sufficiently trained to manage emergency situations including on emergency preparedness and response. Project security personnel should work closely with local, regional, and federal security apparatus to obtain up to date security information so that risks can be avoided or better managed.</p> <p>-Security personnel should not expose themselves to danger unnecessarily and recklessly.</p> <p>-Ensure quick means of communication between workers, security personnel, and government security apparatus in case of emergency. Make sure that communication equipment is always in good working conditions.</p> <p>-Firearms should be kept in good condition and stored in suitable and secure locations.</p> <p>-Security personnel should be well trained in handling firearms. Firearms should not be handled by other project workers.</p> <p>-Security personnel should wear protective equipment, particularly those related to their work.</p> <p>-Keep the number of lone and isolated workers to the minimum to handle emergency situations.</p> <p>-Mitigation measures included in the project Labor Management -</p>			
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	<p>Procedures (LMP) should be considered for the general OHS risks to project workers.</p> <p>-Further reference shall be made to the relevant WBG EHS Guidelines to manage OHS risks to security personnel.</p> <p>-Conduct regular training and awareness project ESMF, LMP, ESHS Guidelines, OHS, safety hazards, projects for project workers, community and IAs;</p> <p>Environmental and Social Clauses for Contractors Consultation</p> <p>Adhere to Hazardous material and Wastes Management set out in the ESMF</p> <p>Adhere to Labor Management Procedures (LMP).</p> <p>Adhere to Liquid and Solid Waste Management Guideline prepared for HOA-GW4RP.</p> <p>Ensure ESHS/OHS provisions are incorporated in the bidding documents and contract agreement for construction.</p> <p>Ensure that waste management is operable to reduce the fuel element for fire</p> <p>Ensure a fire alarm/smoke alarm system is operable within the sites</p> <p>Conduct regular Environmental and Social Monitoring and audit.</p> <p>Conduct regular emergency drills at project sites in coordination with relevant local authorities.</p> <p>Report accidents, incidents, and near misses related to OHS (Annexes 3, 4, and 5 provide incidents reporting templates). Conduct accidents root cause analysis (see Annex 6) and provide remedial measures (see Annex 7).Additional measures are provided in Annex 2 below.</p>			
Labor influx and women trafficking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communicate expectations regarding appropriate conduct, together with disciplinary measures; - Depending on the nature of the project, adoption of a formal code of conduct. - Prevent any kind of involuntary or compulsory labor, such as indentured labor, bonded labor, or similar labor-contracting arrangements. <p>No trafficked persons will be employed in connection with the project.</p>	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU, and administrators • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies, Security players in the devolving government structures
Trespassing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources - Coordination and deconfliction with Ethiopian Defence Forces and regional armed forces - Ensure pre-departure checks are carried out ahead of all journeys 	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands Local Political Officials

	Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management			
Community protest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liaison with all interlocutors at all levels including government security forces, civil society, other parties to the conflict and project beneficiaries - Ensure minimum physical security measures are in place for Staff accommodation when not residing in a Humanitarian Hubs. - IDs provided for identification of staff/project personnel - Where private guards are present, training on active and hostile surveillance and managing crowds Evacuation/relocation plan in place for HoA-GW4RP staff	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands • Local Political Officials
Acts of violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimize on site cash storage, keeping petty cash amounts. - Access control procedures in place as per areas SRM. - Security briefings and training. - Liaison with interlocutors including government security forces - Incident reporting process that should include local authorities - Staff constant advice on maintaining low profile Security staff accompanying missions, when feasible.	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PMCU at the PIT • Contracted firms • Public security Personnel • Private security personnel woreda peace and security bureau
Burglary of workplace/residence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access control in place at all sites, as far as reasonably practicable - Use of unarmed guards/ watchpeople at project sites - Asset management procedures, including inventories - Secure storage of assets, such as warehousing, as outlined in the SOPs - Seek insurance for high value items - Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management Cultivate strong culture of incident reporting and followup	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda HoA-GW4RP program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator Local police
Arrest and detention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recruit dedicated security coordinator to oversee mitigation measures and incident management - Train a crisis management from senior project leadership - Cultivate strong community relationships and information sources - Employ journey management procedures, including route and destination checks prior to departure Use of armed escorts when specifically recommended as absolutely necessary	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies • Security players in the devolving government structures Regional and Woreda

				Administration
Intimidation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Constant engagement with community leaders in HoA-GW4RP operational areas. - Liaison with interlocutors including government security forces - Security briefings and adhoc training to raise situational awareness among personnel - Incident reporting process that should include local authorities - Staff constant advice on maintaining low profile - Security staff accompanying missions, when feasible Relocation plan in place for HoA-GW4RP and MoWE & MoIL staff	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal, regional, woreda PMCU • Contractors and sub-contractors • Implementing Agencies • Security players in the devolving government structures Regional and Woreda Administration
Financial corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Staffing reforms promote competition, performance/meritbased career structures. - Disclosure of assets - Transparent appointment of qualified administrative leaders (and selection of political leaders) - Ring-fencing finances of utilities, separation of roles between local government and utilities - Support for improving integrity of business (professional associations, codes of conduct) - Demonopolizing operations and maintenance - Financial and technical audits and reporting - Performance-based contracts with defined minimum standards - Transparency in operations and management - Citizen role in oversight - Benchmarking utility performance Small/informal providers - Improve interface between formal and informal - Legitimization Formal bulk supply, pricing, competitive tenders for franchises	Medium	Throughout the project implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda HoA-GW4RP program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator Local police

Annex 1: Escalation Matrix

HoA-GW4RP State Alert Level	Alert State GREEN	Alert State GREY	Alert State WHITE	Alert State YELLOW	Alert State RED
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HoA-GW4RP Descriptor	Precautionary	Restriction of Movement	Stabilization Evacuation	Concentration	Relocation/Evacuation
Potential Triggers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Agreement by project coordination units at all level and with stakeholders; - Agreement between project implementers and project workers; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community unrest/conflict; -Limitation of transportation access to project site -- Limitation of access to target - Sites due to insecurity; - Government offices affected in undertaking their day to day activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All Grey Status Triggers, and additionally: - Specific threats against HoA-GW4RP workers; - Armed robbery at HoA-GW4RP office/ activity location; - Serious injury/illness of project personnel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All White Status Triggers, and additionally: - Armed conflict nearby impacting project activities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - All Yellow Status Triggers, and additionally: - Serious assault/fatality of project workers; - Withdrawal of WB Supported projects from the area (or nearby) location; - Withdrawal/lack of government support to ensure security.
HoA-GW4RP Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Normal day to day government operations ongoing -Project activity ongoing -Project coordinators and security focal personnel monitor the security situation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -undertake site specific security risk assessment - The public security officials to notify project coordinators who will in turn notify project workers within 24 hours. - Government security officers accompany project workers, contractors and suppliers during movement to project site -Temporary suspension of activities; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project workers pause field visit to move to safe location; -Project coordinators and security focal personnel to account for workers and project resources regularly. - The public security officials to notify project coordinators who will in turn notify project workers within 24 hours. - Public security officials in liaison with the PMCU assess potential for de-escalation. - Update WBG on proposed options for de-escalation for agreement - Implement agreed de-escalation actions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Project workers to move to concentration points and prepare to relocate to safe location; - Project coordinators and security focal personnel to account for workers and project resources regularly -- The public security officials to notify project coordinators who will in turn notify project workers within 24 hours. - Update WBG on proposed options for de-escalation for agreement - Implement agreed de-escalation actions - Suspension of project activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The public security officials to notify project coordinators who will in turn notify project workers within 24 hours - HoA-GW4RP to review viability of continuing with project activities in a particular location/region - HoA-GW4RP to advise and agree with WBG on proposed way forward (pause/continue/otherwise) - Suspension of project activities

			- Temporary suspension of activities;		
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Annex 2- Security Operating Procedures (SOP)

Security Operating Procedures describes key procedures and how these fit together. These are common procedures including boundary security (perimeter and access control), access-point operations (screening of people and vehicles), incident response (who will respond, and how), security patrols, travel security, materials storage and control, information and communication.

The following major operating security procedures should be implemented and put in place to ensure security within the proposed HoA-GW4RP subproject sites:

Boundary Security: The boundary security in project camps and associated facilities shall be marked by security fences.

Access-Point Operations: project staff and visitors will access camps through designated gates. Searches will only be conducted by security personnel who have received instruction and information regarding the procedure and the legal aspects of search and seizure. Body searches will only be conducted by security personnel of the same gender. Above all, implementing agencies, contractors and sub-contractors shall have booking in and out procedure for all regular project workers and visitors.

Vehicle Access Control Procedures: All Vehicles accessing project facilities will be accessed through the approaching ways suggested in consultation with community and at the gate with the driver only after going through a security check/search for prohibited items i.e., Alcohol Beverages, Firearms, Knives and dangerous drugs. The driver must declare his entire luggage at the main gate (Personal luggage) for checking. Besides, a vehicle access log will be maintained.

Vehicles: All HoA-GW4RP cars in use for operations to be parked within secured compound. Besides, all vehicles must be licensed and checked periodically, and each vehicle must be equipped with a spare tire, a toolbox, first aid Kit and vehicle logbook. Above all, drivers must abide by the traffic laws and not exceed the speed limit; they must immediately report any traffic accident.

Prohibited Items: bringing items such as; knives, guns, alcohol beverages, dangerous drugs, explosives of any type to project sites by workers and visitors are strictly prohibited. The security personnel shall carry out body check and report to the contractor and to the HOA-GW4RP -PMCU.

Incident Response: Any security incidence related to the subprojects directly affecting project staff, equipment and communities should be reported by either the project manager or security personnel in charge to the nearest police post. In the event of a serious insecurity occurrence, the project manager shall report to the HoA-GW4RP -PMCU. The HoA-GW4RP -PMCU will notify the WB Bank within 24 hours.

Security Patrols: Security patrols shall be carried out by the security personnel. Where subprojects are located in areas with high potential insecurity incidence, public security services should be used.

Travel Security: Travel security will be required where subproject staff and equipment are transiting through areas with security risks. In this case, the arrangement for travel security shall be coordinated by HoA-GW4RP -PMCU or regional implementing agencies in coordination with national information network security agency or regional/local security offices. Travel to high-risk areas is subject to a security risk assessment and that the authority be sought from the PMCU Coordinator. Where GSM coverage is not guaranteed, staff should be issued with a satellite phone. Staff should also carry a grab bag, containing food, water, first aid kit, medicines, etc.

Hierarchy of hazard management

a. **Eliminate the Hazard:** Determine if the process, plant, equipment, testing methods, materials or substances are necessary.

b. **Substitute the Hazard:** Reduce the risk by substituting a less hazardous process, plant, equipment, testing method, material or substance (e.g. Replace ladder with scissor lift, Substitute solvent based paint with water based paint, Redesign plant to reduce noise levels, Replace frequent telephone use with headsets).

c. **Isolate the Hazard:** Isolate the hazard by using containment, shielding or distance (Put protection around noisy equipment and Guards over moving parts).

d. **Engineering Controls:** Install barriers, guards, ventilation or alarms to reduce the exposure to the hazard, minimize the size or volume of the hazard. Rearrange the work area and workflow (e.g. Use mechanical aids to reduce manual handling).

e. **Administrative Controls:** Reduce the duration of exposure to the hazard. Intersperse high demand or intense activity with lighter, less intense tasks. Establish safe work practices, provide training and supervision appropriate to the level of expertise of the personnel involved. Introduce procedures, signs, permits to increase awareness of the hazard or limit exposure to the hazard. Administrative controls may be used as a secondary measure to supplement the other agreed risk controls (e.g. Job rotation, work instructions, restricting access to the area, keeping the area free of disorder, being prepared for emergencies, and Training and induction projects).

f. **Personal Protective Equipment:** Provide personal protection. This is the last resort because it is the least reliable and requires high levels of supervision, skills and attention. Personal protection may be used as a secondary measure to supplement the other agreed risk controls (e.g. Hearing protective devices, respirators, hard hats etc.)

Fire: Flammable and explosive materials should also be managed to avoid uncontrolled reactions or conditions resulting in fire or explosion. Hence, Store incompatible materials in separate areas, and with containment facilities separating material storage areas. Besides, material-specific storage for extremely hazardous or reactive materials should be provided. In addition, select materials of construction compatible with products stored for all parts of storage and delivery systems, and avoid reuse of tanks for different products without checking material compatibility. Furthermore, store hazardous materials in an area of the facility separated from the main production works. In cases, proximity is unavoidable, physical separation should be provided using structures designed to prevent fire, explosion, spill, and other emergency situations from affecting facility operations. Prohibition of all sources of ignition from areas near flammable storage tanks.

OHS: HoA-GW4RP PMCU, IA, Contractors will ensure a safe and healthy working environment recognizing the potential OHS risks related to the project. Accordingly, they will ensure that reasonable precautions are taken to protect workers potentially exposed to project related occupation risks. Hence, IAs, contractors and subcontractors shall assess the risks of injury to workers and local community generated by the activities of HoA-GW4RP; providing hostile environment training; provide adequate protective equipment (PPE),

Preparedness to flooding:

1. Monitor your surroundings and monitor Weather Radio, local television and radio stations.
2. If a flash flood warning is issued for your area evacuate to high ground/place immediately.
3. Flash floods develop quickly. Do not wait until you see rising water.
4. Get out of low areas subject to flooding.

5. If driving, do not drive through flooded roadways!
6. Assemble disaster supplies: such as drinking water, food, cash, medication and first aid supplies. Battery-powered radio, flashlights, extra batteries.
7. Important documents: medical records, bank account numbers.
8. Be prepared to evacuate: identify places to go, identify alternative travel routes that are not prone to flooding, fill your car's gas tank and if told to leave, do so quickly.
9. Protect your property: Move hazardous, disconnect electrical appliances and do not touch them if you are wet or standing in water.

Security Supervision and Control: Security supervision and control may be undertaken at various levels which may include at the national, regional, subproject sites and at the contractor levels.

The HoA-GW4RP _PMCU and regional implementing agencies will also work closely with national and regional security offices and other relevant stakeholders to ensure proper management of project security issues which will include:

1. Undertaking security risk assessments and recommend mitigation measures at subproject level;
2. Ensure that security mitigation measures are included in sub-project ESMPs;
3. Monitor potential security risks on subproject sites together with project beneficiaries;
4. With social safeguard specialists, provide training to mitigate social risks of project workers and equipment including security risks;
5. Ensure that the GRM for the project workers is established and implemented and that project workers are informed about it;
6. Monitor the implementation of the workers' CoC for contracted security personnel.

Security Training

To fulfill security related responsibilities project workers, security personnel, community, contractors and other stakeholders at all levels need proper training. This is due to the fact that providing security training and awareness creation is one of the most cost-effective ways of to reduce security threats. The security trainings provided include HoA-GW4RP security Risk Assessment and Management plan, health and safety, Security Operating Procedure, incident reporting and response, human rights, GBV/SEA (Please refer GBV Action Plan), Environmental, Social, Health and Safety (ESHS) provisions, EHS risks on safety hazards at the project sites, Stakeholder Engagement Plan, Grievance Redressing Mechanisms, use of force, etc. Moreover, for staff who will be deployed to high risk areas will receive Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). The Training will be provided by the PMCU, contractors and relevant security structures of the government. If the PMCU have not the required capacity to deliver fit-for-purpose training, it can outsource the service to the external but capable firm.

Information sharing and communication

Regarding the responsibility related to security information sharing and communication focal person assigned at federal, regional and woreda level are responsible. In this regard, communication or information sharing could be Federal, regional and then to woreda or the other way round. For instance, in circumstances where the HoA-GW4RP -PMCU agree with higher level the information sharing and communication will be done by the federal to the regional PMCU and the Regional PMCU will share to woreda. In cases, where the incident or information are happened at the sub-project level it is starts at the contractor to woreda PMCU, the woreda to region, the regional PMCU to federal PMCU, and the federal PMCU shares or communicates to the World Bank. The communication approach would be as set out on the Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP) and could be mobile phone, lined phone, email, official letter, fax etc.

Annex 3: HoA-GW4RP related incident and accident reporting procedure

Purpose

The purpose of this procedure is to outline the requirements, methods and outcomes of reporting all incidents and accidents.

1. Scope

The following incidents and accidents will be reported, irrespective of the nature and level of severity:

1. Fatality and critical injury/illness, illness or injury for which an employee receives/seeks medical attention
2. First aid treatment, occupational disease,
3. Property damage and fire
4. Environmental release (chemical spillages)
5. Explosions
6. Exposures to biological, chemical or physical agents and other related.

3. Roles and Responsibilities

i) Regional Environmental and Social Safeguard Specialists and Project Coordinators

1. Environmental and Social Safeguard Specialists shall continue and regular monitoring and follow up project related incidents and accidents.
2. Report any project related incidents and accidents within 48 hours to Federal Implementing Unit (PMCU).
3. Ensure all woredas are provided with incident and accident reporting Template, and the templates completed.
4. Ensure injured or ill employees have received the required medical treatment and regularly update their health status to the FPMU.

ii) Woreda Environmental and Social Safeguard Focal Persons

5. Shall conduct continuous and regular monitoring and follow up project related incidents and accidents.
6. Report the case to the appropriate local administration entities and other relevant bodies.
7. Ensure the injured persons have received the required medical treatment.
8. Ensure Incident/accident Templates are completed.
9. Report the incident/accident within 24 hours to Regional Project Implementing Unit.

4. Communication

This procedure shall be communicated to all project PMCUs, contractors and sub-contractors and all relevant bodies.

5. Evaluation

Compliance with the accident /incident reporting procedures are monitored regularly as part of Environmental and Social Safeguard Specialists, Environmental and Social Safeguard Focal persons.

Annex 4: Security incident registration form for sub projects of HoA-GW4RP

Region-----Woreda----- Project name -----

Date	
Section 1: recorder /investigator	
Name	Position
Section 2: Incident description	
Date and time of incident:	
Location of incident:	
Detail description of the incident:	
Detail description of the incident from eye wittiness:	
Section C: identify the root cause: what caused the incident to happen?	
Section D: Action taken to mitigate or incidents:	
Section E: Recommended corrective action to prevent future:	

Annex 5: Occupational Health and Safety incident registration form for sub projects of HoA-GW4RP

Region-----Woreda----- Project name -----

Date		
Section 1: recorder /investigator		
Name	Position	
Section 2: Incident description /injury information		
Name of injured employee	Age	Sex
Employee`s job title		
Date and time of incident:		
Location of incident:		
Detail description of the incident:		
Detail description of the incident from eye wittiness:		

Section C: identify the root cause: what caused the incident to happen?
Safety procedures were not followed----- Machine failed or safety equipment failed ----- Lack of proper training (use of the PPE or the machine or other equipment for work) ----- Other, specify.....
Recommended corrective action to prevent future incidents
Corrective Action Taken/Root cause addressed

Annex 6: Steps to conduct Root Cause Analyses (RCA) for a Workplace Accident

1. Conduct root-cause analysis of the incident and identify the sequence of events and factual circumstances. The analysis should identify
2. what failing(s) led to the accident/incident
3. what safety measures were in place, and
4. the risk information/training provided to workers on site/communities.
5. The level of monitoring /supervision of unskilled labor should also be assessed.
6. Recommend actions to be taken to rectify the failure(s) that led to the incident.
7. Review the safety procedures at different sites and identify the health and safety measures to be taken to minimize the risks of future accidents both to workers and to local residents. Site visits should be carried out to a representative sample of construction sites, activities, regions and Contractors as applicable. Health and safety representatives of the Contractors and implementing agencies, as well as other technical counterparts as necessary should be interviewed to gain a comprehensive understanding about health and safety management.
8. Review the OHS measures in Safeguards instruments and plans in construction contracts and recommend enhancements as needed. The assessment should identify what the existing procedures for safe performance of construction activities (excavation, scaffolding, working at heights, welding, etc.) are and should recommend appropriate procedures should the existing ones have gaps.
9. Review the capacity of Contractors and supervision consultants to implement OHS standards. The assessment should review the training plans for skilled and unskilled labor for effectiveness and propose improvements to the training and communication project so that workers are adequately guided to safely perform their work.
10. Review the existing arrangements for recruiting labor and what type of insurance (life or injuries and occupational health risks) and compensations are provided.
11. Review compliance to the Labor Law and other international treaties by Contractors or Subcontractors.
12. Assess the sufficiency of the measures that the Contractors take to minimize risk on the local communities and communicate with them. Recommend improvements as necessary.

Annex 7: Content of a Safeguards/Standards Corrective Action Plan (SCAP) Outline

The contents of the SCAP are driven by the findings of the RCA, and are specific to the type of incident, its location, severity, and project implementing capacity to implement corrective and preventative measures. The SCAP will be implemented by the HoA-GW4R project implementing unit in the developing government structure for serious and severe incidents, with Bank supervision and support. As a general guide, the SCAP could contain the sections set out in the table below:

SCAP Sections	Documentation	Possible Actions	Timeframe for action closures	Monitoring indicators	Responsible body
Immediate to near term actions	Documentation, monitoring and reporting	Stop works, secure the site, provide medical care and counseling, pay compensation, remediate contamination, notify relevant authorities, design and implement response mechanism, etc.	Within 3 months	-No of sites/ subprojects stop work -No of workers received medical care and counseling, received compensation -No of cases notified to relevant authorities etc.	- Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU
Medium term/ongoing actions	Documentation, monitoring and reporting	Stream-line, consolidate and review existing ESHS/OHS monitoring and reporting tools, with a focus on increased monitoring of leading indicators to increase effectiveness.	3-6 months	- ESHS/OHS monitoring and reporting tools stream-lined, consolidated and reviewed	- Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU
	Contractual agreements /enforcement	Review bidding/contractual arrangements to determine if existing language is adequate to ensure sufficient onsite presence of qualified and independent safeguards professionals for adequate implementation of the health safety plan and identify if any adjustments may be necessary for future agreements.	3-6 months	-No of bidding / contractual documents reviewed	- Woreda, regional and Federal PMU
Medium term/ongoing actions	Risk assessment, processes, procedures and training plans for managing risks	example: update risk assessment and management plans to address: • the chance find, clarifying (i) risk factors such as the geophysical characteristics of excavation areas and depth of excavation, the	3-6 months	-Updated Risk assessment and management plan	-HOA-GW4RP Woreda, regional and Federal PMU

SCAP Sections	Documentation	Possible Actions	Timeframe for action closures	Monitoring indicators	Responsible body
		<p>civil war history, (ii) the detailed written information and maps to be obtained from implementer(s) about past surveys and clearance operations before construction can begin, (iii) situations where mechanical excavation should be chosen over manual excavation, (iv) how to safely conduct manual excavation where mechanical excavation is not possible (with input from the implementer(s) and/or other demining experts), (v) develop an adequate training project for workers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fire risk and adequate fire extinguishers placement • Electric risk should also be reviewed, and safe work procedures developed for handling, maintaining and checking electric equipment and extension cords. 			
Medium term/ongoing actions	Permit to work procedure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Permit to work procedures should be developed for high-risk activities with daily verification and sign-off of competent health and safety officers or supervisors. 	3-6 months	- No of high risk activities for which work permit procedure developed	- Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU
	Delayed resettlement compensation	<p>Delayed Resettlement Compensation example: update risk assessment and management plans to address:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on the RCA determination of the reasons for the continued delays in payment of compensation, put in place an effective strategy for addressing 	3-6 months	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Updated Resettlement/compensation plan - Resettlement audit conducted - No of PAPs for which delayed compensation addressed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU - Woreda administration

SCAP Sections	Documentation	Possible Actions	Timeframe for action closures	Monitoring indicators	Responsible body
		<p>them as necessary</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that all outstanding and new claims are appropriately addressed • Determine whether there were impacts that have not previously been considered (livelihoods/loss of business income, vulnerable groups) for which compensation or assistance may be required • Ensure continuing consultation with Project-affected people and a well-functioning grievance mechanism (GRM) • Monitor implementation and provide fortnightly progress reports • Recruit a separate expert to conduct an audit 			
Medium term/ongoing actions	Competencies, roles and responsibilities:	Onsite staffing resources and organizational arrangements dedicated to environment, social safeguards, health and safety by the implementer(s) (e.g., construction company and the supervision consultant) should be reviewed considering the updated risk assessment and findings. This may include adjustments in terms of number, competence, onsite presence, organization, communication and reporting, so that project activities may comply with the EHS/OHS plan requirements.	3-6 months	-No of subproject for which onsite/subproject dedicated ESHS specialist by contractor	- Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU -Contractor and sub-contractors
	High level monitoring and evaluation:	Once the monitoring and reporting system is consolidated, the	3-6 months	-Heavy load that falls near a worker) observed or registered during monitoring,	-Woreda, regional and Federal PMCU

SCAP Sections	Documentation	Possible Actions	Timeframe for action closures	Monitoring indicators	Responsible body
		supervision consultant and PMU should be able to monitor leading indicators such as near-misses (e.g., a heavy load that falls near a worker), and deviations with high-risk potential (e.g., absence of protective barriers, uninsured workers) based on daily observations by the Contractor and the supervision consultant.		-Deviations with high-risk potential (e.g., absence of protective barriers, uninsured workers) observed, registered or reported during monitoring etc.	

Annex 8: Code of Conduct for Contractors'

Code of Conduct (CoC) defines the mandatory Dos and Don'ts expected from each staff member, workers and contractors associated with the project .To build a system for SEA/SH risk prevention and mitigation, the project must:

1. Have all employees of contractors (including sub-contractors) in the project area sign CoCs;
2. Have an effective SEA/SH Prevention and Response Action Plan so that workers understand behaviour expectations and policies, as well as an effective GM. This Action Plan should include training and communication. It should also include plans to make the project-affected community aware of the CoC the project staff have just signed; and
3. As part of the SEA/SH Prevention and Response Action Plan, define accountability and response protocols, which set out the procedures followed for holding individuals accountable and penalizing staff that have violated SEA/SH policies.

Codes of Conduct from Standard Procurement Document

Code of Conduct for Contractor's Personnel (ES) Form

Note to the Employer:

The following minimum requirements shall not be modified. The Employer may add additional requirements to address identified issues, informed by relevant environmental and social assessment.

The types of issues identified could include risks associated with: labor influx, spread of communicable diseases, Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (SEA) etc.

Delete this Box prior to issuance of the bidding documents

Note to the Bidder:

The minimum content of the Code of Conduct form as set out by the Employer shall not be substantially modified. However, the Bidder may add requirements as appropriate, including to take into account Contract-specific issues/risks.

Code of Conduct for Contractor's Personnel

We are the Contractor, [enter name of Contractor]. We have signed a contract with [enter name of Employer] for [enter description of the Works]. These Works will be carried out at [enter the Site and other locations where the Works will be carried out].Our contract requires us to implement measures to address environmental and social risks related to the Works, including the risks of sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence.

This Code of Conduct is part of our measures to deal with environmental and social risks related to the works. It applies to all our staff, labourers and other employees at the works site or other places where the works are being carried out. It also applies to the personnel of each subcontractor and any other personnel assisting us in the execution of the works. All such persons are referred to as “Contractor’s Personnel” and are subject to this Code of Conduct.

This Code of Conduct identifies the behavior that we require from all Contractors’ Personnel. Our workplace is an environment where unsafe, offensive, abusive or violent behavior will not be tolerated and where all persons should feel comfortable raising issues or concerns without fear of retaliation.

REQUIRED CONDUCT

Contractor’s Personnel shall:

1. Carry out his/her duties competently and diligently;
2. Comply with this Code of Conduct and all applicable laws, regulations and other requirements, including requirements to protect the health, safety and well-being of other Contractor’s Personnel and any other person;
3. Maintain a safe working environment including by:
 - a) Ensuring that workplaces, machinery, equipment and processes under each person’s control are safe and without risk to health;
 - b) Wearing required personal protective equipment;
 - c) Using appropriate measures relating to chemical, physical and biological substances and agents; and following applicable emergency operating procedures.
4. Report work situations that he/she believes are not safe or healthy and remove himself/herself from a work situation which he/she reasonably believes presents an imminent and serious danger to his/her life or health;
5. Treat other people with respect, and not discriminate against specific groups such as women, people with disabilities, migrant workers or children;
6. Not engage in any form of sexual harassment including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other unwanted verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature with other Contractor’s or Employer’s Personnel;
7. Not engage in Sexual Exploitation, which means any actual or attempted abuse of position of vulnerability, differential power or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. In Bank- financed projects/operations, sexual exploitation occurs when access to or benefit from Bank- financed Goods, Works, Consulting or Non-consulting services is used to extract sexual gain;
8. Not engage in Rape, which means physically forced or otherwise coerced penetration—even if slight—of the vagina, anus or mouth with a penis or other body part. It also includes penetration of the vagina or anus with an object. Rape includes marital rape and anal rape/sodomy. The attempt to do so is known as attempted rape. Rape of a person by two or more perpetrators is known as gang rape;
9. Not engage in Sexual Assault, which means any form of non-consensual sexual contact that does not result in or include penetration. Examples include: attempted rape, as well as unwanted kissing, fondling, or touching of genitalia and buttocks not engage in any form of sexual activity with individuals under the age of 18, except in case of pre-existing marriage;
10. Complete relevant training courses that will be provided related to the environmental and social aspects of the Contract, including on health and safety matters, and Sexual Exploitation, and Sexual Abuse (SEA);
11. Report violations of this Code of Conduct; and
12. Not retaliate against any person who reports violations of this Code of Conduct, whether to us or the Employer, or who makes use of the [Project Grievance [Redress Mechanism].

RAISING CONCERNS

If any person observes behavior that he/she believes may represent a violation of this Code of Conduct, or that otherwise concerns him/her, he/she should raise the issue promptly. This can be done in either of the following ways:

1. Contact [enter name of the Contractor's Social Expert with relevant experience in handling gender-based violence, or if such person is not required under the Contract, another individual designated by the Contractor to handle these matters] in writing at this address [] or by telephone at [] or in person at []; or
2. Call [] to reach the Contractor's hotline (if any) and leave a message.

The person's identity will be kept confidential, unless reporting of all allegations is mandated by the country law. Anonymous complaints or allegations may also be submitted and will be given all due and appropriate consideration. We take seriously all reports of possible misconduct and will investigate and take appropriate action. We will provide warm referrals to service providers that may help support the person who experienced the alleged incident, as appropriate.

There will be no retaliation against any person who raises a concern in good faith about any behavior prohibited by this Code of Conduct. Such retaliation would be a violation of this Code of Conduct.

CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING THE CODE OF CONDUCT

Any violation of this Code of Conduct by Contractor's Personnel may result in serious consequences, up to and including termination and possible referral to legal authorities.

FOR CONTRACTOR'S PERSONNEL:

I have received a copy of this Code of Conduct written in a language that I comprehend. I understand that if I have any questions about this Code of Conduct, I can contact [enter name of Contractor's contact person with relevant experience in handling gender-based violence] requesting an explanation.

Name of Contractor's Personnel: [insert name]

Signature:

Date: (day month year):

Counter signature of authorized representative of the Contractor:

Signature: _____ Date: (day month year): _____

Annex 9: Code of conduct of security personnel

General Conduct

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will require their security personnel to, treat all persons humanely and with respect for their dignity and privacy and will report any breach of this Code.

Rules for the Use of Force

2. The PMCU, IA or contractor will adopt Rules for the Use of Force consistent with applicable law and the minimum requirements contained in the section on Use of Force in this Code and agree those rules with the Client.

Use of Force

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will require their security personnel to take all reasonable steps to avoid the use of force. If force is used, it shall be in a manner consistent with applicable law. In no

case shall the use of force exceed what is strictly necessary and should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation.

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will require that their security personnel not use firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.
2. To the extent that security personnel are formally authorized to assist in the exercise of a state's law enforcement authority, The PMU, IA or contractor will require that their use of force or weapons will comply with all national and international obligations applicable to regular law enforcement officials of that state and, as a minimum, with the standards expressed in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990).

Detention

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will only, and will require their security personnel will only, guard, transport, or question detainees if: (a) the Company has been specifically contracted to do so by a state; and (b) its Personnel are trained in the applicable national and international law. Member and Affiliate Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, treat all detained persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law or international humanitarian law, including in particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Apprehending Persons

2. The PMCU, IA or contractor will, and will require their security personnel to, not take or hold any persons except when apprehending persons to defend themselves or others against an imminent threat of violence, or following an attack or crime committed by such persons against Company Personnel, or against clients or property under their protection, pending the handover of such detained persons to the Competent Authority at the earliest opportunity. Any such apprehension must be consistent with applicable national or international law and be reported to the Client without delay. The PMCU, IA or contractor will, and will require that their Personnel to, treat all apprehended persons humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights law, including in particular prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Prohibition of Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will not, and will require that their security personnel not, engage in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For the avoidance of doubt, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as referred to here, includes conduct by a private entity which would constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if committed by a public official.
2. Contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as an armed conflict or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national or international security, internal political instability, or any other public emergency, can never be a justification for engaging in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
3. The PMCU, IA or contractor will, and will require that their Personnel, report any acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, known to them, or of which they have reasonable suspicion. Such reports will be made to the Client and one or more of the following: the

competent authorities in the country where the acts took place, the country of nationality of the victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse or Gender-Based Violence

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will not benefit from, nor allow their security personnel to engage in or benefit from, sexual exploitation (including, for these purposes, prostitution) and abuse or gender-based violence or crimes, either within the Company or externally, including rape, sexual harassment, or any other form of sexual abuse or violence. The PMCU, IA or contractor will, and will require their security personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based violence and, where discovered, report such instances to competent authorities.

Human Trafficking

2. The PMCU, IA or contractor will not, and will require their security personnel not to, engage in trafficking in persons. The PMCU, IA or contractor will, and will require their personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of trafficking in persons and, where discovered, report such instances to Competent Authorities. For the purposes of this Code, human trafficking is the recruitment, harbouring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for (1) a commercial sex act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2) labour or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery.

Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will not use slavery, forced or compulsory labour, or be complicit in any other entity's use of such labour.

Prohibition on the Worst Forms of Child Labour

2. The PMCU, IA or contractor will respect the rights of children (anyone under the age of 18) to be protected from the worst forms of child labour, including: a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in provision of armed services; b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs; d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children. Member and Affiliate Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, report any instances of the activities referenced above that they know of, or have reasonable suspicion of, to Competent Authorities.

Discrimination

1. The PMCU, IA or contractor will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, discriminate on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, social origin, social status, indigenous status, disability, or sexual orientation when hiring Personnel and will select Personnel on the basis of the inherent requirements of the contract.

Identification and Registering

2. The PMCU, IA or contractor , to the extent consistent with reasonable security requirements and the safety of civilians, their Personnel and Clients, will: a) require all Personnel to be individually identifiable whenever they are carrying out activities in discharge of their contractual responsibilities; b) ensure that their vehicles are registered and licensed with the relevant national authorities whenever they are carrying out activities in discharge of their contractual responsibilities; and c) will ensure that all hazardous materials are registered and licensed with the relevant national authorities.

Annex 10: List of SRAMP Study Participants

- I. List of Participants-Dire Dawa City Administration-Water, mines and Energy Office (September 23-24, 2022)
- A. List of Stakeholders for HoA-GW4RP Stakeholder Consultation-Dire Dawa City Administration

IV. List of Participants:

S.no	Name	Sex	Position	Phone number	E-mail address	Signature
1	Hailu Teklu	M	Safeguard	0915753939	hailu.teklu@yahoo.com	
2						
3						
4						
5						
Total						

Hailu Teklu
Environmental
and Safeguard Expert

Name	Gender	Position	Phone No.	Email Address
Dire Dawa Administration				
Eskindir Hamid	Male	Dire Dawa WME-Hydrologist	0920909400	
Ayub Ibrahim	Male	Dire Dawa WME-Study and Design Team Lead	0915016353	
Dire Dawa Administration-Jeldessa Cluster				
Sedale Amed	Male	Jeldessa Cluster-Community Facilitator	0915047394	
Taju Mohammed	Male	Jeldessa-Debele Kebele-Chair man		

B. Kebele Level Community Participants-Dire Dawa Administration-Jeldessa Cluster/Woreda-Debele Kebele-Tereko Village-List of Participants

September 24, 2022

Debele Kebele — Tereko village

1. መሀል መሀመድ አብ	35	አሳ አሳመድ	69	አሳ አሳ
2. ተረ መሀመድ አብ	36	አሳ አሳ	70	አሳ አሳ
3. አሳ አሳ	37	አሳ አሳ	71	አሳ አሳ
4. አሳ አሳ	38	አሳ አሳ	72	አሳ አሳ
5. አሳ አሳ	39	አሳ አሳ	73	አሳ አሳ
6. አሳ አሳ	40	አሳ አሳ	74	አሳ አሳ
7. አሳ አሳ	41	አሳ አሳ	75	አሳ አሳ
8. አሳ አሳ	42	አሳ አሳ	76	አሳ አሳ
9. አሳ አሳ	43	አሳ አሳ	77	አሳ አሳ
10. አሳ አሳ	44	አሳ አሳ	78	አሳ አሳ
11. አሳ አሳ	45	አሳ አሳ	79	አሳ አሳ
12. አሳ አሳ	46	አሳ አሳ	80	አሳ አሳ
13. አሳ አሳ	47	አሳ አሳ	81	አሳ አሳ
14. አሳ አሳ	48	አሳ አሳ	82	አሳ አሳ
15. አሳ አሳ	49	አሳ አሳ	83	አሳ አሳ
16. አሳ አሳ	50	አሳ አሳ	84	አሳ አሳ
17. አሳ አሳ	51	አሳ አሳ	85	አሳ አሳ
18. አሳ አሳ	52	አሳ አሳ	86	አሳ አሳ
19. አሳ አሳ	53	አሳ አሳ	87	አሳ አሳ
20. አሳ አሳ	54	አሳ አሳ	88	አሳ አሳ
21. አሳ አሳ	55	አሳ አሳ	89	አሳ አሳ
22. አሳ አሳ	56	አሳ አሳ	90	አሳ አሳ
23. አሳ አሳ	57	አሳ አሳ	91	አሳ አሳ
24. አሳ አሳ	58	አሳ አሳ	92	አሳ አሳ
25. አሳ አሳ	59	አሳ አሳ	93	አሳ አሳ
26. አሳ አሳ	60	አሳ አሳ	94	አሳ አሳ
27. አሳ አሳ	61	አሳ አሳ	95	አሳ አሳ
28. አሳ አሳ	62	አሳ አሳ	96	አሳ አሳ
29. አሳ አሳ	63	አሳ አሳ	97	አሳ አሳ
30. አሳ አሳ	64	አሳ አሳ	98	አሳ አሳ
31. አሳ አሳ	65	አሳ አሳ	99	አሳ አሳ
32. አሳ አሳ	66	አሳ አሳ	100	አሳ አሳ
33. አሳ አሳ	67	አሳ አሳ		
34. አሳ አሳ	68	አሳ አሳ		

C. Kebele Level Community Participants-Dire Dawa Administration-Jeldessa Cluster/Woreda-Debele Kebele-Tereko Village-Photo/picture of Participants (September 24, 2022)



II. List of Participants-SNNP-Gamo Zone-Water, Irrigation and Mines Development Department (September 29-30, 2022)

A. List of Stakeholders for HoA-GW4RP Stakeholder Consultation-SNNP-Gamo Zone WIM and Arba Minch Zuria Woreda-WME

Name	Gender	Position	Phone No.	Email Address
Gamo Zone				
Endrias Wage	Male	Gamo WIM-Head of the Department	0973313030	wageendrias@gmail.com
Daniel Abebe	Male	Gamo WIM-Water Supply and Sanitation Study and Design Team Lead	0911768483	danielabebe@gmail.com
Arba Minch Zuria Woreda				
Milkias Ashe	Male	Arba Minch Zuria Woreda WME-Head	0913735659	Milkiasashe@gmail.com
Muluken Geletu	Male	Arba Minch Zuria Woreda WME-Vice Head	0969762525	dukegeletu@gmail.com

B. Zone and Woreda Level Stakeholders-Gamo Zone-Arab Minch Zuria Woreda-Photo/picture of Participants (September 29, 2022)



C. Kebele Level Community Participants-Gamo Zone-Arba Minch Zuria Woreda-Chano Mille Kebele-Chano Mille Village-List of Participants

GAMO ZONE- ARBA MINCH ZURIA WOREDA
CHANO MILLE KEBELE - Chano Mille Village

D. List of Participants

September 30, 2022

S.no	Name	Sex	Social status	Village	Phone number	Signature
1	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	FHH Head	Chano Mille	0918120111	[Signature]
2	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	"	"	0913235663	[Signature]
3	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	"	"		[Signature]
4	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	"	"	0131801574	[Signature]
5	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	"	"	0920066090	[Signature]
6	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	FHH	"		[Signature]
7	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	"	"		[Signature]
8	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	"	"		[Signature]
9	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	"	"		[Signature]
10	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	MHH	"		[Signature]
11	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	FHH	"		[Signature]
12	አባነሽ ለገሰ	F	FHH	"		[Signature]
13	አባነሽ ለገሰ	M	MHH	"	0913732707	[Signature]
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						
Total						

8

D. Kebele Level Community Participants-Gamo Zone-Arba Minch Zuria Woreda-Chano Mille Kebele-Chano Mille Village-Photo/Picture of Participants





III. List of Participants-Sidama-Water, Mines and Energy Bureau (October 03-04, 2022)
A. List of Stakeholders for HoA-GW4RP Stakeholder Consultation-Sidama WME and Shebedino Woreda-WIME Office

Name	Gender	Position	Phone No.	Email Address
Sidama				
Endrias Girma	Male	Sidama WME-Senior Water Engineer and HoA-GW4RP Focal Person	0994341515	endrigirma@gmail.com
Tesfahun Bayu	Male	Sidama WME-Senior Hydrologist	0936494841	tesfahuns14@gmail.com
Shebedino Woreda				
Debebe Debaro	Male	Shebedino Woreda WIME-Head	0916155469	maitodebele@gmail.com
Basha Barasha	Male	Shebedino Woreda WIME-Vice Head and Water Supply Head	0916021005	

B. Sidama Region and Woreda Level Stakeholders-Gamo Zone-Arab Minch Zuria Woreda- Photo/picture of Participants (October 03, 2022)





C. Kebele Level Community Participants-Sidam-Shebedino Woreda-Diramo Aferara Kebele-Diramo Aferara Village-List of Participants

Sidamu - Shebedino Woreda
Diramo Aferara - Kebele
D. List of Participants October 04, 2022

S.no	Name	Sex	Social status	Village	Phone number	Signature
1	Kinine Wawiso	M	K/Cherman	Diramo	0913066056	[Signature]
2	Wawiso Damiso	M	K/ulash	Diramo	0916030113	[Signature]
3	Eisa Kebede	M	K/Cherman	Diramo	0916055603	[Signature]
4	Xiletu Kachan	M	K/Cherman 2nd	Diramo	0926700947	[Signature]
5	Abayne Daniel	M	W/Gidie	Diramo	0926581850	[Signature]
6	Muse Albiso	M	Adult	"	0911831788	[Signature]
7	Leafisha Lotu	M	Adult	"	0937214895	[Signature]
8	Eliyas Jamsso	M	Adult	"	0916153534	[Signature]
9	Beltire Daled	F	Adult	"	0935661982	[Signature]
10	Bizimeshi Tena	F	Adult	"	0935661982	[Signature]
11	Pawlosi Bolka	M	Adult	"	0926120820	[Signature]
12	Sante Tesfaye	F	21	"	-	[Signature]
13	Atata Bushu	F	"	"	0931520383	[Signature]
14	MEJERET Laila	F	"	"	0931380796	[Signature]
15	Shurruke Chuko	F	"	"	0925532	[Signature]
16	Mellese Negeso	M	"	"	0926328085	[Signature]
17	Awchamo Gachan	M	"	"	0925692534	[Signature]
18						
19						
20						
Total						

8

D. Kebele Level Community Participants-Sidam-Shebedino Woreda-Diramo Aferara Kebele-Diramo Aferara Village-Photo/picture of Participants



Annex 11: Data Collection Tool

I. Stakeholders Interview-Regional and City Levels

A. Stakeholder Consultation Participants:

1. Regional/Zone Level: Head Water, Mines and Energy Bureau/ Head Water, Mines and Energy Office/ Head Water, Irrigation and Mines Development Department; Head of Regional Project Coordination Unit, Environmental and Social Safeguards Experts/Citizen State Engagement Specialist or Gender Specialist,
2. Woreda Level: Head Water, Irrigation, Mines and Energy Office/ Head Water, Irrigation, Mines and Energy Office/ Head Water, Mines and Energy Office; Head of City Project Coordination Unit, Environmental and Social Safeguards Experts/Citizen State Engagement Specialist or Gender Specialist,

B. Basic Information of Participants:

- i. Name of the Official/Expert: _____
- ii. Name of the Region: _____
- iii. Name of City: _____
- iv. Name of Office: _____
- v. Date of consultation conducted: _____
- vi. Consultation Start Time: _____
- vii. Consultation End Time: _____
- viii. Venue: _____
- ix. Name of Consultation Moderator: _____

i. List of Participants:

S.no	Name	Sex	Position	Phone number	E-mail address	Signature
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
Total						

ii. Discussion Points (Agenda) for Stakeholders Interview-Regional and Woreda/City Levels

*Short description on the tools and purpose of the data collection (must read this initially before the commencement of actual interview/ FGD sessions).

This KII tool guide is prepared mainly to gather relevant data on community and staff security risk conditions of HoA-GW4RP workers and overall project beneficiary communities on your area/Woreda. Data collected from this KII is aiming to only inform the security risk assessment of HoA-GW4RP or project activities. Assessment team members will keep Information gathered strictly confidential, hence your volunteer participation on interview sessions as well as genuine answers are greatly appreciated.

A. Key Informant interview guiding Questions for project staffs: (for project coordinators or site level project supervisors).

1. Who in the PMCU/PIT is likely to be exposed to threats or targeted, when and where (for instance, expatriates; nationals/locals of different political, religious or ethnic affiliations; males; females; different positions in the organization)?
2. Does the location of operations (and movements between them) increase exposure to threats?
3. What assets are likely to be vulnerable, and where? Assets are typically vulnerable to theft, looting, damage or destruction (by natural disasters, acts of war, criminal acts and acts of terror). Consider different locations where assets may be targeted: in the office, in residences, in warehouses, while being moved (the physical movement of cash, vehicles on the road, supplies on the road, construction site, distribution points).
4. How often do you experience security threat incidents? Indicate on the table below.

Incidents	Probability of Occurrence				
	1- Improbable	2-Seldom	3- occassional	4-Likely	5- Frequently
Armed robbery					
Armed conflict between government and non-government forces					
Theft to construction materials at project site.					
Access blockage to some					

project regions and Woredas.					
Risk of GBV/SEA/SH/VAC/VAW					
Local conflict occurs between ethnic groups and clans					
Labor Influx and Women Trafficking					
Trespassing					
Community protests					
Unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair					
Acts of violence					
Burglary of work place/residence					
Arrest and Detention					
Intimidation					
Abduction					
Other Specify					

5. Have you reported an incident affecting you or other people during the time you have worked in HoA-GW4RP?
6. Do you think the staffs are well-trained and security-conscious? Are security issues discussed on a regular basis? Has the PMCU/PIT had a longstanding presence in the area, and does it have strong local networks to keep it apprised of changes in conditions?
5. Do HoA-GW4RP-PIT or PMCU- put staff in the path of military or insurgency and counterinsurgency operations? Are operations too close to potential political or military targets? Can entry and exit routes be affected?
6. Does the HoA-GW4RP challenge social and cultural norms or religious principles, for instance programs to empower women?

7. What are the three biggest security threats (anything that can harm you) that you face, working for HoA-GW4RP?
8. What coping strategies are currently being pursued and why, and how effective are they?
9. What resources can be used to address current needs?